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EXCAVATING FROM THE INSIDE:
RACE, GENDER, AND PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
―Class, race, sexuality, gender—and all other categories
by which we categorize and dismiss each other—need to be excavated from
the inside.‖1
I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney begins by asking Juror Number Four, a white male,
questions about his background. ―Do you have any legal training?‖
―No,‖ Juror Number Four replies.
―Please tell me your present occupation.‖
―I do construction and landscaping.‖
―Do you have children?‖
―Yes.‖
―How many?‖
―Two.‖
The questions continue until the attorney moves on to another
potential juror.
The men and women in the jury box know why they are being
questioned. The attorneys for both sides are trying to determine whether
these individuals would make ―good‖ jurors. Can they be fair?
Impartial? With whom will they relate?
Eventually, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor requests
that Juror Number Two, a black male, be excused. Next, the prosecutor
requests that Juror Number Six, another black male, be excused. Defense
counsel objects. ―Your Honor, the State is attempting to use its
peremptory challenges to strike black men from the jury because of their
race and sex. I ask that you require the State to offer race and gender
neutral reasons for its challenges.‖
The judge replies, ―There are quite a few black females on the venire.
And there are quite a few white men. It doesn‘t appear that the State is
discriminating based on race or gender.‖2
―Your Honor,‖ defense counsel explains, ―the State is attempting to
excuse these jurors based on their race and gender identity. The answers
that these jurors provided in response to the State‘s questions were all
very similar to the answers offered by white male jurors, but the State
did not excuse the white male jurors. And both of these jurors assured
DOROTHY ALLISON, SKIN: TALKING ABOUT SEX, CLASS & LITERATURE 35 (1994).
This hypothetical situation is loosely based on People v. Washington. See 628 N.E.2d
351, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).

1
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the court that they would be fair and impartial decisionmakers. Also,
most of the State‘s witnesses are going to be black females, while the
defendant is a black male. Eight percent of the venire was comprised of
black males, and now the State has prohibited all of these black men
from serving on this jury. This isn‘t mere coincidence. I respectfully
request that the court require the State to explain why these two
individuals cannot serve on this jury.‖
―What‘s so magical about black men?‖ asks the judge. 3 ―Peremptory
challenges cannot be based on race, but the State isn‘t eliminating all
blacks. Black women are on the jury. Peremptory challenges cannot be
based on sex. Here, there are men on the jury and their race is irrelevant.
The State is free to excuse these individuals without raising an inference
of discrimination. Your motion is denied.‖ The final jury is seated: six
white men, one white woman, and five black women. One white
woman and one black woman serve as alternates.
In America, the right to a trial by jury is a greatly respected and
Although
constitutionally protected aspect of the legal system. 4
participation in the judicial system was at one time expressly limited by
race and gender identity, the law is now clear that individuals cannot be
prohibited from serving on a jury because of their race, ethnicity, or

This statement is based on the judge‘s statement in People v. Motton. See 704 P.2d 176,
178 (Cal. 1985). In that case, the trial judge asked defense counsel, ―What‘s so magic [sic]
about Black women?‖ when the defense tried to establish a prima facie case of race-gender
discrimination against black women. Id.
4
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (―The petit jury has occupied a central
position in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the
arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.‖) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968)); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (―[T]he trial by jury ever has
been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law.‖). This respect
for jury trials is entrenched in the belief that a just result is obtained through the
deliberation and subsequent decision by a jury of one‘s peers. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (―It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common
affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from
admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.‖). But see RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT,
THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM xx (2003) (―Why should anyone think that twelve persons
brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of general ability, should
have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?‖) (quoting Erwin
Griswold, then Dean of Harvard Law School). The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in
criminal cases by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Additionally, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury in civil
cases. Id. at VII. The right to a trial by jury in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment,
however, is not incorporated to the States. JONAKAIT, supra, at 2. Although juries decide
some civil cases, a large proportion of state civil trials are not decided by a jury. Id. at 13–
14.
3
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gender.5 Additionally, defendants have a right to be tried by a jury
selected through a process free from race and gender discrimination.6
Despite these nondiscriminatory principles, discriminatory practices in
jury selection continue to permeate the courtrooms, news reports, and
public debate.7 The role of race, gender, and race-gender identity during
jury selection, although a seemingly settled issue, has not been resolved.
Courts are still struggling to determine whether peremptory challenges
may be based on the combination of a potential juror‘s race and gender
identity, as illustrated in the introductory hypothetical.8
Part II of this Note first provides an overview of the jury selection
process and outlines the state of the law regarding peremptory
challenges.9 Part II also summarizes the methods by which courts have

5
See JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 114–15 (explaining that, historically, blacks and women
were not permitted to serve on juries). Even after the United States Supreme Court held
that equal protection proscribes racial limitations on jury service, many jurisdictions
implemented policies that prohibited black people from serving on juries. Id. at 115; see also
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that African American men
cannot be prohibited from serving on juries). Women were also excluded from jury service
until the twentieth century. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 131 (1994). In Strauder v. West
Virginia, where the Supreme Court held that African American men could not be
prohibited from serving on juries because of their race, the Court refused to extend such
protection to women. See 100 U.S. at 310 (limiting the Court‘s holding prohibiting black
men from being denied the right to sit on a jury). Furthermore, after women were finally
permitted to serve on juries, states imposed additional requirements that served to prohibit
and discourage female participation. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131–32.
6
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309 (―And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored
man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has
expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in
other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?‖). But see Barbara D.
Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right is It, Anyway?, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 725, 728–36 (1992) (recognizing the notion that race discrimination in jury
selection violates a defendant‘s equal protection rights, but contending that no justification
exists to support this proposition).
7
See Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 937 (Miss. 2007) (acknowledging that race-based
discrimination continues to occur during jury selection despite the Supreme Court‘s
attempt to end this discriminatory practice); Shaila Dewan, Study Finds Blacks Blocked from
Southern Juries, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A14 (discussing a recently published study
finding widespread race discrimination in jury selection); Dirk Olin, One Angry Man: The
Lament of the Peremptorily Challenged, SLATE, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/
2111247/ (discussing one man‘s experience being peremptorily challenged, allegedly due
to his race-gender identity, and asserting that the use of peremptory challenges is ―little
more than an invitation to judge-approved jury rigging.‖).
8
See infra Part II.C (describing the difficulty that courts face when considering
objections to peremptory challenges allegedly based on the potential juror‘s race-gender
identity).
9
See infra Part II.A (outlining the evolution of the law as it relates to peremptory
challenges). This author uses the terms ―peremptory challenge‖ and ―peremptory strike‖
interchangeably.
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addressed claims of race-gender-based discrimination in employment
and jury selection.10 Next, Part III analyzes the approaches courts have
used when determining whether equal protection tolerates race-genderbased peremptory challenges.11 Finally, this Note advocates that states
should prohibit race-gender-based challenges and proposes a model
state statute easing the burden for litigants objecting to allegedly
discriminatory peremptory strikes.12
II. BACKGROUND OF RACE-GENDER IDENTITY AND THE LAW
A discussion of whether peremptory challenges may be based on a
potential juror‘s race-gender identity requires an understanding of the
history of race and gender in jury selection. Part II.A of this Note
describes the jury selection process and the United States Supreme
Court‘s attempts, thus far, to ensure that peremptory challenges are not
exercised in violation of equal protection. 13 As a source of comparison,
Part II.B examines the courts‘ experiences addressing claims of racegender discrimination in employment and Part II.C highlights the
challenges that courts have faced when addressing similar claims during
jury selection.14
A. Jury Selection, Peremptory Challenges, and Equal Protection
The jury selection process begins by summoning potential jurors to
sit on the venire.15 Once the venire is assembled, litigants engage in voir
See infra Part II.B (chronicling the caselaw development regarding race-gender-based
discrimination in employment); infra Part II.C (identifying the way courts have handled
allegations of race-gender-based discrimination during jury selection).
11
See infra Part III (articulating the problems with different approaches that courts have
taken when determining whether to deem race-gender groups cognizable).
12
See infra Part IV (proposing a model state statute).
13
See infra Part II.A (examining equal protection analysis as applied to peremptory
challenges).
14
See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of Title VII jurisprudence relating to
race-gender discrimination); infra Part II.C (surveying the approaches that courts have
taken in regards to peremptory challenges based on the combination of race and gender).
15
JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 119 (indicating that the group of individuals summoned to
the courthouse from which the trial jury is selected may be referred to as the jury pool, the
array, venires, or talesmen). Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―venire‖ as ―[a] panel of
persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the jurors are to be chosen.‖
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1694 (9th ed. 2009). The word ―venire‖ literally means ―you are
called to come.‖ JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 49 (1988). The Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968 governs the creation of the jury venire in federal courts.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (2006). Additionally, the Sixth Amendment requires that the
venire reflect a fair cross-section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538
(1975); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (identifying the analysis to be
10
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dire, the process of questioning potential jurors. 16 After voir dire,
potential jurors are excused for hardship, cause, or through the use of a
peremptory challenge.17 Peremptory challenges are meant to aid in the
selection of an impartial jury by permitting parties to excuse potential
jurors from the venire, whom they fear may favor the opposing party,

applied in determining whether the fair cross-section requirement has been violated).
Although the fair cross-section requirement applies only to criminal cases, civil trials are
also affected by the requirement because governments use the same jury lists for civil and
criminal trials. JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 119. The Supreme Court has declined to extend
the fair cross-section requirement beyond the jury pool or venire. See Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1990) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
requirement does not extend to the petit jury). See generally Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution
Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79,
83 (2004) (offering an overview of the fair cross-section requirement).
16
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009). Black‘s law dictionary defines ―voir
dire‖ as ―[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide
whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.‖ Id. The voir dire process
is constitutionally required in criminal cases in order to assure that the chosen jurors are
impartial to the case. JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 129. Voir dire also helps parties uncover
actual or implied bias that may become a basis for a peremptory challenge. J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994); see also JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE
AND JURY SELECTION: GAIN AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING YOUR JURY (2005)
(exploring the deeper significance of nonverbal cues such as body movement, position,
orientation, eye contact, shrugs, facial expressions, word choice, speed of speech, and tone
of voice).
17
JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at 134–35, 139. Courts may excuse jurors from jury duty if
requiring the juror to participate will impose undue hardship on the juror. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1866(c) (permitting the court to excuse a juror for undue hardship or extreme
inconvenience); id. § 1869(j) (defining ―undue hardship‖). The Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968 defines ―undue hardship‖ as
great distance, either in miles or traveltime, from the place of holding
court, grave illness in the family or any other emergency which
outweighs in immediacy and urgency the obligation to serve as a juror
when summoned, or any other factor which the court determines to
constitute an undue hardship or to create an extreme inconvenience to
the juror; and in addition, in situations where it is anticipated that a
trial or grand jury proceeding may require more than thirty days of
service, the court may consider, as a further basis for temporary
excuse, severe economic hardship to an employer which would result
from the absence of a key employee during the period of such service.
Id. A juror who exhibits partiality may be challenged for cause. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 976 (Revised 9th ed., Thomson/West 2008)
(1968). In contrast, peremptory challenges permit a party to remove a potential juror
without offering proof of partiality. Id.; see BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 161–62 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining peremptory challenge as ―[o]ne of a party's limited number of challenges that do
not need to be supported by a reason unless the opposing party makes a prima facie
showing that the challenge was used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex‖);
cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (noting that the ―essential nature‖ of the
peremptory challenge is the fact that it may be exercised without explanation).
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without explaining their decision.18 The challenge, however, is not
limitless. Striking a juror because of their race, ethnicity, or gender
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 19
In general, equal protection demands that courts review classifications
on the basis of race or gender with heightened scrutiny. 20 The Supreme
Court has held that discrimination on the basis of race or gender in the
context of jury selection cannot withstand such scrutiny. 21
Consequently, lower courts are left with a legal quandary, as they are
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (opining that peremptory
challenges are valuable because they help to ensure the selection of a fair jury by
permitting parties to ―eliminat[e] extremes of partiality‖) (citing Holland v. Illinois, 496
U.S. 474, 484 (1990)); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (―[The]
sole purpose [of the peremptory challenge] is to permit litigants to assist the government in
the selection of an impartial trier of fact.‖); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (explaining that in
addition to eliminating extremes of partiality, peremptory challenges help to ―satisfy the
appearance of justice‖) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
19
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of
peremptory challenges on the basis of gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369
(1991) (plurality opinion) (analyzing the trial court‘s determination that the prosecutor did
not discriminate against Latinos, thus applying Batson‘s framework to ethnicity-based
challenges); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits prosecutors from peremptorily challenging potential jurors because of
their race); see also Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 856 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(explaining that courts have used the terms race, ethnicity, and national origin
interchangeably). These limitations were imposed to comply with the demands of equal
protection. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖). Although on its face the amendment
only applies to the states, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause applies
to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
20
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (emphasizing that in order for
a state to discriminate on the basis of gender, it must offer an ―exceedingly persuasive‖
justification); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1967) (explaining that equal application of
a statute prohibiting interracial marriage would not alter the heavy burden of justification
that a state must provide in order to discriminate on the basis of race). The extent of the
justification that the government must set forth depends on the nature of the class that the
government wants to distinguish. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 618–23 (2d
ed. 2005). Laws that distinguish between individuals on the basis of race are subject to
strict scrutiny. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. Thus, the government must demonstrate that the
means are ―narrowly tailored‖ to achieve a ―compelling government interest.‖ Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). Laws that discriminate on the basis of
gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (explaining that the
State must show that classifications based on gender serve ―important governmental
objectives‖ and the means are ―substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives‖) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)); see also
Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place; Asserting Our Rights,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 39 (1989) (analyzing whether heightened scrutiny should be
applied to black women as a discrete group).
21
See infra note 51 and accompanying text (expanding the prohibition of race-based
peremptory challenges to gender-based peremptory challenges).
18
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responsible for determining whether unexplained peremptory
challenges are actually based on protected aspects of jurors‘ identities.22
Because of the inherent difficulty in making this determination, the use
of peremptory challenges elicits concern that they will be exercised in a
discriminatory fashion, subsequently harming everyone involved.23
Many commentators who share this fear advocate abolition of the
challenge.24 While states are free to eliminate it, the actions of many state
See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text (discussing the current three-prong test
most courts apply when litigants object to the exercise of a peremptory challenge).
23
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140–42 (describing the harm caused by discrimination in jury
selection). First, litigants are harmed when discrimination occurs during jury selection
because it increases the risk that prejudice will affect the entire trial. Id. at 140. Also, the
community suffers when discrimination enters jury selection because it causes the public to
lose confidence in the justice system. Id. Furthermore, striking jurors from the jury because
of their race or gender sends the message that the juror is inferior, thus attacking their
dignity. Id. at 141–42; cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 n.8 (―By compromising the representative
quality of the jury, discriminatory selection procedures make ‗juries ready weapons for
officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered among
unpopular or inarticulate minorities.‘‖) (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945));
Underwood, supra note 6, at 726–27 (asserting that the injury caused by race discrimination
in jury selection is primarily the negative effect such discrimination has on the excluded
juror); Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, E.J.I. REP. (Equal
Justice Initiative, Montgomery, Ala.), June 2010, at 28–34 (describing the experiences of
various people of color who were excused from jury service through the exercise of a
litigant‘s peremptory challenge).
The fear that peremptory challenges will be used to discriminate against potential
jurors based on their race, gender, or ethnicity is not unfounded. Jack McMahon, for
example, became infamous in the legal community for his statements in a 1986
Philadelphia District Attorney training video where he recommended the use of race- and
gender-based stereotypes in an attempt to find ―jurors that are unfair and likely to
convict.‖ Jack McMahon, Fear of a Black Jury, HARPER‘S BAZAAR, July 2000, at 27
[hereinafter McMahon, Fear]. McMahon advocated the use of race, gender, and racegender stereotypes as a guide for exercising peremptory challenges. Id. at 26–29. For
example, McMahon stated, ―Black women are very bad. There‘s an antagonism. I guess
maybe they‘re down-trodden in two respects—they‘re women and they‘re blacks—and
they want to take it out on somebody, and you don‘t want it to be you.‖ Id. at 28; see also
Jack McMahon, Jury Rigging Laid Bare, HARPER‘S BAZAAR, June 1997, at 21 [hereinafter
McMahon, Laid Bare] (―If you're going to take blacks, you want older black men and
women, particularly men. Older black men are very good.‖). Race-, gender-, or racegender-based discrimination is not always so overt, which only adds to the inherent
difficulty of uncovering such discrimination. See DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
STEREOTYPING 293–94 (Kurt W. Fischer, E. Tory Higgins, Marcia Johnson & Walter Mischel
eds., Guilford Press 2004) (discussing subtle forms of discrimination that may not be
consciously realized by the person exhibiting the discrimination).
Furthermore,
stereotypes that describe individuals based on a combination of categories are often much
richer than stereotypes that describe individuals based on one overarching category. See id.
at 80–83 (discussing attributes of ―compound categories,‖ or the way people identify others
by using two or more categories, such as ―gay male athlete‖ or ―black female lawyer‖).
24
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (advocating abolition of the
peremptory challenge); Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
22
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courts and the United States Supreme Court illustrate that it is unlikely
the peremptory challenge will be abolished.25
(Meyers, J., concurring) (asserting that the time has come to abolish the peremptory
challenge). Judge Meyers cites to decisions written by three other judges similarly
concluding that peremptory challenges ought to be eliminated. Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 861.
One of these judges went so far as to ban all peremptory challenges in her courtroom. Id.;
see Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that
peremptory challenges are unlawful and a waste of time). But see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained:
Not only is it implausible that such a permanent and universal feature
of our jury-trial system is unconstitutional, but it is unlikely that its
elimination would be desirable. The peremptory challenge system has
endured so long because it has unquestionable advantages. . . . [I]t is a
means of winnowing out possible (though not demonstrable)
sympathies and antagonisms on both sides, to the end that the jury
will be the fairest possible. In a criminal-law system in which a single
biased juror can prevent a deserved conviction or a deserved acquittal,
the importance of this device should not be minimized.
Id.
Others have taken a middle-ground approach and call for modification of the Batson
procedure. See James A. Domini & Eric Sheridan, Batson Challenges and the Jury Project: Is
New York Ready to Eliminate Discrimination from Criminal Jury Selection?, 11 ST. JOHN‘S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 169, 187–89 (1995) (proposing that states abandon the use of peremptory
challenges and adopt a revised system using challenges for cause); Brian W. Stoltz,
Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers Enforce the Principles of Batson, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1047–54 (2007) (advocating the use of a peremptory block challenge where
lawyers could preemptively ―block‖ the use of peremptory challenges against selected
jurors and a juror who had been ―blocked‖ would automatically be placed on the jury if
opposing counsel attempted to peremptorily strike the juror); Underwood, supra note 6, at
772–73 (proposing an effort to regulate peremptory challenges rather than abolish them).
25
People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 783 (Ill. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has
expressed reservation about further limiting the use of peremptory challenges); Pfister v.
State, 650 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (opining that the Court has shown concern
regarding trial courts limiting parties‘ use of peremptory challenges post-Batson and J.E.B.);
Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 938 (Mass. 2007) (explaining that the courts are not likely to
prohibit peremptory challenges as a whole, regardless of the fact that race still appears to
play a role in jury selection); Deana Kim El-Mallawany, Comment, Johnson v. California
and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3333, 3335 (2006) (contending
that the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005) and Miller-El
v. Dredke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), illustrate that peremptory challenges ―are still valid features
of the American jury trial‖); Jennifer Ross, Note, Snyder v. Louisiana: Demand for Judicial
Scrutiny of the Use of Peremptory Challenges, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL‘Y SIDEBAR 305,
313 (2009) (asserting that the majority opinion in Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008)
suggests it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will consider abolishing peremptory
challenges any time soon). Regardless of whether the Supreme Court abolishes the
challenge, individual states could do so because state law defines the right to exercise
peremptory challenges in state courts and peremptory challenges are not essential to a fair
trial or the selection of an impartial jury. See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009)
(―This Court has ‗long recognized‘ that ‗peremptory challenges are not of federal
constitutional dimension.‘‖) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311
(2000)).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/10

Provost: Excavating from the Inside: Race, Gender, and Peremptory Challen

2010]

Excavating from the Inside

315

The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of racebased peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.26 Petitioner Swain, an
African American male, was convicted of rape by an all-white jury.27 Of
the eight African Americans in the venire, six were struck by the
prosecutor using peremptory challenges and two were exempt for other
reasons.28 Although the Court recognized that discriminatory jury
selection violates equal protection, the evidence presented in Swain‘s
case was insufficient to prove discrimination.29 The Court rejected the
possibility that a single case could ever offer sufficient evidence of an
equal protection violation; rather, a litigant would need to prove that the
prosecutor struck African Americans from the jury in ―case after case.‖30

380 U.S. 202, 209–24 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 203, 205 (identifying the facts of Swain v. Alabama). Justice Goldberg further
described the details of the case, explaining that the petitioner was only nineteen years old
and his punishment for the rape of a seventeen-year-old white female was death. See id. at
231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
28
Id. at 205 (majority opinion). The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was
not the only issue relating to racial discrimination raised in the case. Id. Swain also
claimed that discrimination was inherent in the selection of the venire. Id. The Court held,
however, that Swain provided insufficient evidence to state a claim. Id. at 206. The dissent
attempted to place Swain‘s allegations in context, explaining that despite the fact that
African Americans constituted twenty-six percent of the population of Talladega County
eligible for jury service, no African American had ever served on a jury. See id. at 231–32
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (expressing disagreement with the majority for finding that Swain
failed to carry his burden of proof in light of the fact that the venire selection method was
discriminatory and peremptory challenges were employed in a race-based manner).
29
Id. at 203–04 (majority opinion) (reiterating that it violates equal protection to deny
individuals the right to serve on a jury because of their race); id. at 224 (holding that the
evidence in this case was inadequate to establish an equal protection violation). But see id.
at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (disapproving of the majority opinion and emphasizing
that the opinion ―creates additional barriers to the elimination of jury discrimination
practices‖). The dissent asserted that the defendant offered sufficient evidence to make a
case for a violation of equal protection. Id. at 232.
30
Id. at 222–23 (majority opinion) (identifying the evidence required to establish an
equal protection violation). The Court explained it could not subject peremptory
challenges to traditional equal protection standards because such a decision would
completely change the nature of the challenge. Id. at 221–22. Nonetheless, a showing that
no African Americans ever serve on juries due to a prosecutor‘s unrelenting use of
peremptory challenges, regardless of the circumstances, may be sufficient to violate equal
protection. Id. at 223–24. Although the Court recognized that no jury in the county had
included an African American juror during the fifteen years prior to Swain, the evidence
offered by the defendant in this case was still insufficient. Id. at 226. Twenty-one years
later, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court would describe Swain‘s requirement that the
defendant prove the prosecutor violated equal protection by establishing the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges over time as a ―crippling burden.‖ See Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1986) (opining that Swain left peremptory challenges
―largely immune from constitutional scrutiny‖).
26
27
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The Court revisited Swain in Batson v. Kentucky.31 In Batson, the
prosecutor peremptorily struck all black males from the venire and an
all-white jury tried and convicted the defendant. 32 The Court held that
this evidence, consisting of only the prosecutor‘s actions in this case,
could be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of race
discrimination.33 In essence, Batson reaffirmed Swain‘s principle that
striking jurors because of their race violates equal protection.34 The
Court, however, rejected Swain‘s burdensome evidentiary requirements
and set forth a three-prong test to be applied when a party objects to a
peremptory challenge.35
After a party objects to a peremptory challenge, the objecting party
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful
Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (holding that race-based peremptory challenges violate equal
protection). The defendant in Batson, an African American male, was indicted on charges
of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Id. at 82. After the Supreme Court heard Batson‘s
case, Batson pled guilty to burglary and served a five-year sentence. Kay Stewart, ―Good‖
Reversal Followed ―Unfair‖ Trial, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Nov. 6, 2005, http://www.
courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051106/NEWS01/511060406. When
asked what Batson thought about his Supreme Court case, Batson explained, ―It‘s so old,
they ought to let it go.‖ Id.
32
Batson, 476 U.S. at 83 (describing the prosecution‘s use of peremptory challenges). The
judge explained that parties can use peremptory challenges to ―strike anybody they want
to.‖ Id.
33
Id. at 100 (remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration of the issue).
Not all of the Justices were convinced that race-based strikes violate equal protection. See
id. at 137–38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist stated the following:
In my view, there is simply nothing ‗unequal‘ about the State‘s using
its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases
involving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also used to
exclude whites in cases involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases
involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian
defendants, and so on. This case-specific use of peremptory challenges
by the State does not single out blacks, or members of any other race
for that matter, for discriminatory treatment. Such use of peremptories
is at best based upon seat-of-the-pants instincts, which are
undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many cases be
hopelessly mistaken. But as long as they are applied across-the-board
to jurors of all races and nationalities, I do not see—and the Court most
certainly has not explained—how their use violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
Id.
34
Id. at 91 (majority opinion). The Batson Court quoted Justice Frankfurter and
emphasized that ―[a] person‘s race simply ‗is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.‘‖ Id. at 87
(quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
35
Id. at 93 (holding that contrary to the decision in Swain, a single case could provide
sufficient evidence to establish an equal protection violation); id. at 96–98 (identifying a
procedure for courts to employ when the defendant objects to the prosecution‘s use of
allegedly discriminatory peremptory strikes); see also infra notes 36–49 and accompanying
text (discussing Batson‘s three-prong test).
31
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discrimination.36 In order to establish a prima facie case, the objecting
party must show that the challenged juror is a member of a cognizable
group and that this group membership was the basis for the strike. 37 The
court considers all relevant circumstances when determining whether
the objecting party established a prima facie case.38 This may include, for
example, statements made by the parties during voir dire or statistical
evidence as to the racial composition of the jury.39 The objecting party

Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
Id.; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (defining cognizable or
―identifiable group‖ as one ―that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied‖); Murchu v. United States, 976 F.2d 50,
54 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining what a defendant must show, for Batson purposes, ―to
establish membership in a ‗cognizable group‘‖). Membership is established by showing
that (1) the group is definable and limited by some clearly identifiable
factor, (2) a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences runs
through the group, and (3) a community of interests exists among the
group‘s members, such that the group‘s interest cannot be adequately
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. A
further ingredient of cognizability is that the group be one of the
members of which are experiencing unequal, i.e. discriminatory,
treatment, and needs protection from community prejudices.
Id.; see also People v. Young, 105 P.3d 487, 541–42 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring)
(comparing the definition of cognizable group applied in California courts with the
definition applied by federal courts).
38
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97.
39
Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that statistical evidence is
relevant when determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been
established); Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 343 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
statements made during voir dire may be used to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination); People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246–47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(clarifying that a numerical argument, although relevant, cannot alone form the basis for a
prima facie showing of discrimination). One court has articulated the following
considerations for determining whether a litigant has established a prima facie showing of
discrimination:
(1) racial identity between the [party exercising the peremptory
challenge] and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes
against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of
peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons; (4)
the level of African-American representation in the venire as compared
to the jury; (5) the prosecutor‘s questions and statements [of the
challenging party] during voir dire examination and while exercising
peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American
venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only
common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and
witnesses.
People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 790 (Ill. 2006) (quoting People v. Williams, 670 N.E.2d 638,
650 (Ill. 1996)).
36
37
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needs only to produce enough evidence of discrimination to permit the
judge to draw an inference that discrimination occurred. 40
Notably, some courts have eliminated the prima facie requirement
altogether and hold that a litigant satisfies this first step simply by
raising the Batson challenge.41 These courts have found that elimination
of this requirement simplifies the Batson inquiry and better protects the
equal protection rights of defendants and jurors. 42

Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 173 (2005) (rejecting California‘s interpretation of
the Batson standard requiring that the objecting party show that it is ―more likely than not‖
that the other party‘s peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias).
41
See United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366, 368 (C.M.A. 1989) (eliminating the prima facie
requirement in military courts); State v. Morales, 806 A.2d 902, 913 n.16 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) (explaining that the Connecticut Supreme Court has eliminated Batson‘s prima facie
requirement at the first step of the burden shifting procedure); Melbourne v. State, 679 So.
2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (identifying the requirements that a litigant must fulfill to move past
the first step of the Batson procedure: the challenger must timely object, state that the juror
is a member of a distinct racial group, and request the court to ask opposing counsel to
articulate a neutral reason for the strike); State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 940 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc) (eliminating the prima facie requirement); State v. Edwards, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (S.C.
2009) (―When one party strikes a member of a cognizable racial group or gender, the trial
court must hold a Batson hearing if the opposing party requests one.‖); see also State v.
Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1132–33 (Fla. 2008) (Cantero, J., dissenting) (noting that forty-six
states follow the procedure as outlined by Batson, but Connecticut, Missouri, South
Carolina, and Florida have chosen to follow Batson‘s procedure only in regards to steps two
and three).
42
See Moore, 28 M.J. at 368 (explaining that elimination of the prima facie requirement is
beneficial because it simplifies the Batson process and makes the process fairer to the
defendant); Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1126 (Pariente, J., concurring) (explaining that Florida‘s
simplified Melbourne procedure has been beneficial overall); State v. Livingston, 220 S.W.3d
783, 786–87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc) (―[T]he Missouri Supreme Court developed a
more unitary procedure for the vindication of Batson claims that better protects the equal
protection rights of a defendant and facilitates the efficient administration of justice in this
state.‖). In her concurring opinion, Judge Pariente noted that the Supreme Court‘s decision
in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), illustrated that the Batson inquiry was meant to
address suspicions that a challenge was discriminatory. Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1127. The
Johnson Court set a low burden for litigants who object to a peremptory challenge. Id.
Florida‘s decision to lower the burden imposed by Batson‘s first step, even lower than the
standard articulated by the Johnson Court, helps eliminate confusion created by imposing a
high burden at the first step of Batson. Id. at 1130.
Judge Pariente also addressed the concern that elimination of the prima facie
requirement will result in an influx of superfluous objections to peremptory challenges. Id.
at 1127. Although she conceded a problem could arise if litigants objected to all
peremptory challenges, Judge Pariente explained that in her experience, she failed to see
any such ―explosion‖ of frivolous objections caused by Florida‘s altered Batson procedure.
Id. at 1127 n.2. Furthermore, attorneys have an obligation as an officer of the court to avoid
making frivolous objections to opposing counsel‘s peremptory challenges. Id. at 1127. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from making needless objections.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) (prohibiting a lawyer from asserting an
issue in a proceeding unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so); MODEL RULES OF
40
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If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the proponent
of the challenge must offer a neutral justification for it. 43 The explanation
does not need to be as thorough as one offered to justify a challenge for
cause, but the proponent must do more than merely state that the juror‘s
membership in a protected group was not a factor. 44 Currently, the
courts are divided as to whether a Batson violation is established if the
proponent of the challenge offers an impermissible justification along
with permissible justifications.45 For example, if a litigant claims that a
juror‘s age (a permissible justification) and race (an impermissible
justification) formed the basis for the strike, some courts hold that the
impermissible justification ―taints‖ the entire challenge, therefore ending
the Batson inquiry and finding a per se Batson violation.46 Other courts

PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2008) (asserting that a lawyer may not knowingly disobey an
obligation set by the court).
43
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
44
Id. at 97, 98. The Supreme Court has stated ―implausible or fantastic justifications may
(and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.‖ Purkett v.
Elem., 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam). Courts have held a wide variety of
justifications to be race- or gender-neutral for purposes of a Batson challenge. See, e.g.,
United States v. Meza-Gonzales, 394 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the trial court‘s
determination that the prosecutor‘s asserted reason for using a peremptory challenge to
strike the only racial minority from the venire—that the juror had brightly colored
fingernails and was a social worker—was race-neutral); United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d
1245, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding the trial court‘s determination that the prosecutor‘s
assertion that she was trying to empanel ―born-and-bred District of Columbia resident[s]‖
was sufficiently race-neutral).
45
Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(considering whether a peremptory challenge based partially on a potential juror‘s race,
along with an additional factor, violates equal protection). Judge Johnson recognized a
split in authority in the Texas criminal appellate courts, federal courts, and other state
courts, as to whether a peremptory challenge is valid if it is based, in part, on race. Id. at
868–69. It seems as though the Supreme Court could have answered this question in
Snyder v. Louisiana, but the Court did not reach the question as to whether the traditional
dual motivation test applies to peremptory challenges. See 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008). Rather,
the Court explained that it was ―enough to recognize that a peremptory strike shown to
have been motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained
based on any lesser showing by the prosecution.‖ Id. The Court left unanswered the
question of what constitutes a ―lesser showing.‖ If any permissible justification is
considered a lesser showing, then essentially the ―tainted‖ approach would apply.
46
Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 869 (Johnson, J., dissenting). For a list of the courts adopting the
―tainted‖ approach, see James R. Gadwood, Note, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down:
JuryQuest in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 301 nn.74–77 (2008) (citing Sockwell v.
State, 675 So. 2d 38, 40–41 (Ala. 1995); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001);
Robinson v. United States, 890 A.2d 674, 681 (D.C. 2006); Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994); McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ind. 2004); Payton v.
Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998); Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991)
(per curiam), abrogated in part by Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 252–54 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (en banc); State v. Jagodinsky, 563 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)).
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apply a mixed motive or dual motivation analysis and attempt to
determine whether the juror would have been struck based solely on the
permissible justification.47
Finally, if the proponent sets forth a neutral basis for the strike, the
trial court must determine whether the challenger has shown purposeful
discrimination.48 Due to the inevitable fact that this determination often
depends on the demeanor of the attorney exercising the challenge,
appellate courts defer to the trial court‘s determinations regarding the
third prong, absent exceptional circumstances.49
Until 1994, the Supreme Court had only applied Batson to cases
involving race-based challenges.50 This changed, however, in J.E.B. v.
Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 869 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Russell D. Covey, The
Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L.
REV. 279, 346–47 (2007) (arguing against application of a Title VII mixed motive analysis to
Batson‘s second prong). Covey notes that the current trend among courts is to adopt a dual
motivation approach. Covey, supra, at 300–01 (citing cases from the Second, Third, Fourth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits adopting a dual motivation approach). See generally Kurtis
A. Kemper, J.D., Annotation, Adoption and Application of ―Tainted‖ Approach or ―Dual
Motivation‖ Analysis in Determining Whether Existence of Single Discriminatory Reason for
Peremptory Strike Results in Automatic Batson Violation When Neutral Reasons Also Have Been
Articulated, 15 A.L.R. 6TH 319 (2006) (identifying cases adopting or applying both tainted
and dual motivation analysis). Courts applying ―mixed motive analysis‖ adopted this
analysis from Title VII employment cases. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973) (articulating the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis); infra notes
66–69 and accompanying text (describing the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
procedure). In those cases, courts have had to consider whether, and to what extent, a
protected criterion may be a factor in the employer‘s decision. See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining that a defendant may
avoid liability for discrimination if it can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
would have taken the same action even if the discriminatory factor was not considered).
Notably, the Price Waterhouse decision has been superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which clarifies that an employer cannot avoid liability by showing its actions would have
been the same without the discriminatory motive. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)
(clarifying the causation requirements under Title VII).
48
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (discussing the final step of Batson‘s
burden shifting procedure).
49
Id. (―We have recognized that these determinations of credibility and demeanor lie
‗peculiarly within a trial judge‘s province‘ . . . .‖) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 365 (1992) (plurality opinion)). In Snyder, however, the Court illustrated that
deference to the trial court is not always appropriate. See id. at 479 (explaining that, in this
case, there was no reason to defer to the trial judge‘s decision because the judge failed to
make any specific findings regarding the courtroom demeanor of the challenged juror and
the judge did not consider the challenge until many other jurors had been questioned).
50
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1994) (examining the history of race-based
challenges). Not surprisingly, some members of the legal community did not agree with
the Batson decision, even though its command was limited to race at this point. See
McMahon, Fear, supra note 23, at 26–29 (noting that one Philadelphia District Attorney, Jack
McMahon, taught new district attorneys techniques to avoid Batson‘s requirements).
McMahon described the case of Batson v. Kentucky as follows:
47
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Alabama.51 In J.E.B., the State was alleged to have used its peremptory
challenges to strike male jurors from the venire, solely because they were
men.52 Interestingly, the Court began its analysis by reviewing the
history of discrimination against women and comparing it to the history
of discrimination against African Americans.53
Next, the Court
I‘m sure you‘re all familiar with Batson v. Kentucky. It‘s the case where
the guy was convicted . . . by an all-white jury because the prosecutor
had struck all blacks. They ruled that it was not due process. In the
future, we‘re all going to have to be aware of that, and the best way to
avoid any problems is to protect yourself. My advice is that when you
do have a black jury, question them at length. And mark something
down that you can articulate at a later time if something happens,
because only after a prima facie showing can the trial judge order you
to show why you‘re not striking them on a racial basis.
Id. at 29. McMahon was highly criticized and eventually reprimanded for teaching other
lawyers how to avoid Batson‘s command. See Michael Janofsky, Under Siege, Philadelphia’s
Criminal Justice System Suffers Another Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1997, at A14.
51
See 511 U.S. at 129 (―We hold that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality.‖).
52
Id. The Court noted that the petit venire included ten male jurors and the State used
nine peremptory strikes to remove males from the venire. Id. The trial court, however,
rejected the respondent‘s objection to the use of the peremptory challenges, explaining that
Batson only applied to race-based challenges and not to challenges based on gender. Id.
The appellate court affirmed the decision and the Alabama Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Id. at 129–30.
53
Id. at 135–37. The Court described the historical justifications for the exclusion of
women from the jury. Id. at 132–33. In general, women were believed to need protection
from the ―depravity of trials.‖ Id. at 132. Society felt that women were ―too fragile and
virginal to withstand the polluted courtroom atmosphere.‖ Id. The Court further stated
that even after women were emancipated, courts permitted states to enact laws requiring a
woman to volunteer to serve on a jury rather than impose mandatory jury service on
women, as it did with men. Id. at 134. The Court rejected these notions as outdated and
antiquated and further compared women‘s history of discrimination to the history of
discrimination against African Americans. Id. at 135–36. For example, the Court explained
that both slaves and white women were prohibited from ―hold[ing] office, serv[ing] on
juries, or bring[ing] suit in their own names.‖ Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion)). In comparison, even after African American males
were given the right to vote, women were forced to wait nearly half a century until they
were granted that right. Id. at 136. Stereotypes about women continue to pervade
American society today, as illustrated in the way the media has portrayed women in
movies and television shows. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 344–47 (describing the
selective and stereotypic presentation of women in the media). Schneider notes the
following examples of the stereotypical portrayal of women in the media:
In commercials, women represent domestic products more often than
do men; males are more likely to use reasoned arguments for product
use, to have more authority, and to appear as spokespersons for more
expensive products. . . . In music videos men are presented as
aggressive and women as sexually suggestive, provocatively clothed,
subservient, and the targets of sexual advances. . . . Women patients in
medical advertisements tend to have pleasant expressions, whereas
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considered whether the use of gender-based challenges advances the
State‘s sole interest in permitting peremptory challenges: the selection of
an impartial jury.54 The Court determined that gender-based challenges
do not assist in the selection of an impartial jury and are likely to
generate the same harms that race-based challenges create.55 Thus, the
Court held that challenging jurors because of their gender violates equal
protection.56
Although Batson plainly articulates one method of addressing
discrimination in jury selection, defining the groups that are protected
from discrimination has proved troublesome.57 Clearly, litigants can no
male patients are more serious; this difference may contribute to the
alleged tendency of physicians to take female complaints less seriously
than males.
Id. at 345–46 (citations omitted). Notably, the J.E.B. Court added that even if males had not
suffered a past history of discrimination, it is unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis
that he or she holds a particular view because of their gender. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141–42
(explaining that the right to nondiscriminatory jury selection extends to both women and
men).
54
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8. Interestingly, J.E.B. was a case involving child support
and the respondent argued that gender discrimination should be permitted in this type of a
case because men may relate more with a man in a paternity action and women may be
more receptive to the statements made by the mother of the child. See id. at 137–38. The
Court rejected this argument. Id. at 138. Many recent studies have confirmed that the
Court‘s decision to reject the argument was correct, as these studies show that jury verdicts
and jurors‘ race, gender, or socioeconomic status are unrelated. See SEAN G. OVERLAND,
THE JUROR FACTOR: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICA‘S CIVIL COURTS 11 (Melvin I. Ruofsky
ed., LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2009) (explaining that despite popular belief that the
racial or gender composition of the jury affects the jury‘s verdict, most research on the issue
has proved otherwise). But see JONAKAIT, supra note 4, at xxi (noting that some
commentators have suggested that jury selection determines the outcome of the case). For
example, one professor has stated ―[a] familiar wisecrack is that in England the trial begins
when the jury is selected; in America, that is when the trial is over.‖ Id.
55
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140–42 (describing the harm stemming from gender
discrimination as affecting the litigants, the community, and struck jurors). The Court
explained that if it were to accept the argument that women are more sympathetic to
certain arguments than men, it would be basing its decision on ―the very stereotype the law
condemns.‖ Id. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). Even if there
were some truth to the stereotype, the Constitution prohibits the State from relying on
impermissible stereotypes. Id. at 139 n.11. The Court further explained that if it permitted
discrimination on the basis of gender, litigants might use gender as a proxy for race
discrimination. Id. at 145. In many cases involving gender-based peremptory challenges,
the excused jurors were female and members of a racial minority. Id. at 145 n.18. This
illustrates that race and gender are overlapping categories, necessitating a prohibition on
the use of gender-based peremptory challenges. Id. at 145.
56
Id. at 130–31.
57
See infra Part II.C (illustrating the uncertainty surrounding whether race-gender-based
groups are cognizable for purposes of Batson). Courts have been asked to deem a wide
variety of groups cognizable. Cf. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994) (denying
certiorari in a case questioning whether jurors may be struck because of their religion);
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longer rely on race- or gender-based stereotypes when exercising strikes,
but it remains in dispute as to whether race-gender identity may form
the basis of a peremptory challenge. 58 Before examining this debate, this
Note first reviews the treatment that race-gender identity has received in
the employment law context.59
B. Race, Gender, and Title VII
Peremptory challenges are only one area of law in which courts have
developed a means to uncover discrimination. 60 For example, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to discriminate against
any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
in employment and other workplace conduct.61 Title VII jurisprudence is
helpful to consider because the Batson Court adopted its three-prong test
from Title VII caselaw.62 Also, Title VII and Batson both prohibit certain
actions from being taken when they are based on specific aspects of a
person‘s identity, but they permit the same actions to be taken when

United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (challenging blind jurors does
not violate equal protection because the prosecutor planned to use video evidence); Rico v.
Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding Italian Americans could be a
cognizable group); United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1044 (2000) (challenging individuals with a disability is permissible because disability
may be a legitimate basis on which to measure juror capability); United States v. SantiagoMartinez, 58 F.3d 422, 422–23 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding obese individuals do not constitute a
cognizable group); People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 692 (Cal. 1983) (holding that ―guilt phase
includables,‖ a group of individuals who would vote automatically against the death
penalty, is not a cognizable group); State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1140 (N.J. 2004)
(explaining that Batson has been extended to challenges based on religious affiliation, but
distinguishing religious affiliation from religious beliefs); Courtney A. Waggoner,
Comment, Peremptory Challenges and Religion: The Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court
Opinion, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 326–27 (2004) (calling for the Supreme Court to determine
whether religion is a protected status for purposes of Batson).
58
See infra Part II.C (outlining various courts‘ treatment of race-gender-based strikes).
59
See infra Part II.B (exploring the history of claims of race-gender-based discrimination
in the employment setting).
60
See supra Part II.A (discussing peremptory challenge jurisprudence).
61
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000) (prohibiting certain forms of discrimination in
employment). In enacting this legislation, Congress attempted to remove arbitrary barriers
to employment. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). ―Congress
did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person regardless of
qualifications. . . . [T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.‖
Id. at 800 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)). See generally
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON & IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND
LITIGATION III-1 to III-183 (2009) (offering a thorough overview of Title VII).
62
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) (explaining that Title VII cases set
forth the prima facie burden of proof rules that the Court applies in Batson).
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based on permissible considerations.63 Thus, Title VII is a natural source
of comparison.64
When a plaintiff files suit under Title VII and offers indirect evidence
of discrimination, the court applies the McDonnell Douglas test, a threestep burden shifting procedure.65 First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.66 To establish a prima facie case, the
plaintiff must show he or she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2)
qualified for the position for which the plaintiff applied; (3) was rejected;
and (4) the position remained open or was filled by someone not in the
plaintiff‘s protected class.67 Once a prima facie case has been established,
63
See Covey, supra note 47, at 331–32 (describing the justifications supporting a
comparison of Title VII to peremptory challenge jurisprudence). Title VII was enacted to
prevent all forms of race discrimination, including subtle discrimination, from influencing
employment decisions. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801 (―[I]t is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.‖). This goal
corresponds neatly to the application of equal protection to peremptory challenges because
Batson and its progeny seek to prevent undisclosed race and gender discrimination from
influencing jury selection. See supra Part II.A (identifying the framework used to eliminate
race- and gender-based challenges). Furthermore, the text of Title VII does not explicitly
state that race-gender groups are cognizable. See § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, the Supreme
Court has not explained whether race-gender groups are protected under Batson. See infra
notes 78–80 and accompanying text (describing one court‘s statutory analysis of Title VII
and whether it permits race-gender claims). The arguments supporting or criticizing the
extension of Title VII to race-gender groups are similar to those offered when determining
whether race-gender-based strikes are permissible.
See infra notes 78–80 and
accompanying text (describing one court‘s reasons for recognizing race-gender
discrimination in Title VII cases). Title VII and the Batson procedure, however, have an
obvious dissimilarity. Title VII is statutory and the groups deemed protected are explicitly
set forth in the text. See § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ―race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin‖). In contrast, Batson and its progeny place limits on
peremptory challenges due to the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. See supra Part
II.A (describing the limitations that have been placed on peremptory challenges). Another
difference between Title VII and Batson is that Title VII reaches facially neutral practices
that have a disparate impact on a protected group, whereas disparate impact is not enough
to support a Batson challenge. Compare Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
991 (1988) (holding that disparate impact analysis applies to subjective and objective
employment practices), with United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that disparate impact is not a proper basis for a Batson challenge and inevitably
rejecting a claim that peremptorily striking teachers violates Batson because it has a
disparate impact on women).
64
See supra note 63 (describing why it is beneficial to consider Title VII when discussing
issues regarding peremptory challenges).
65
See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (outlining the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting procedure); see also Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56
(1981) (clarifying the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting procedure).
66
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the elements a plaintiff must
prove in order to show purposeful discrimination in the employment setting).
67
Id. This burden is not meant to be onerous; the plaintiff must only prove these
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. The elements that
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the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a neutral reason for its
actions.68 If the employer presents a legitimate, non-discriminatory
justification, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
employer‘s proffered justification was pretext for a discriminatory
motive.69
the plaintiff must prove will necessarily vary depending on the facts of each case.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. In theory, Title VII cases seem to require that
the plaintiff prove that he or she is a member of a protected minority class or female. See
Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999) (―Indeed, if strictly
applied, the prima facie test would eliminate all reverse discrimination suits.‖). The courts,
however, have not required that the plaintiff establish that his group membership, which is
the basis for his claim, is also a group that has experienced a past history of discrimination.
Id. (explaining that Title VII plaintiffs do not need to be members of a group that has
suffered a history of past discrimination). In fact, it appears that reverse discrimination
claims, or allegations of discrimination against members of a traditionally privileged
group, are on the rise. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying a
Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case
Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 53–54 (1999) (explaining that more Americans believe
white males are increasingly being discriminated against because of their race-gender
identity and identifying statistics illustrating the growing number of reverse discrimination
claims being filed); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 317 n.1 (explaining that members of
racial minorities have prejudices about whites and whites are not the only people who
discriminate against others on the basis of race). In the summer of 2009, reverse
discrimination claims garnered excessive media attention when the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), holding that the City of New
Haven violated Title VII when it refused to certify the results of a promotion exam because
the results were such that only white firefighters would have received promotions. See
Supreme Court to Rule on Firefighter Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 27, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31584071/ (describing the case as ―closely watched‖);
Douglas S. Malan, A Long Journey to a Landmark Decision, CONN. L. TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2009,
http://www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx?id=35862 (noting the intense media
attention the case received). In Ricci, the Court held that the City of New Haven would
have been able to defend its decision only if the City could show it had a strong basis in
belief that it would have been liable on a disparate impact theory if it certified the results.
129 S. Ct. at 2664. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to meet that standard. Id.
68
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (articulating the second step of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis). The employer‘s burden is one of production. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55.
69
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 (describing the third step of the McDonnell
Douglas procedure). The plaintiff always retains the burden of persuasion. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256. In order to meet her burden, the plaintiff may use direct evidence to establish
that ―a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer.‖ Id. Alternatively, the
plaintiff may use indirect evidence to ―show[] that the employer‘s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.‖ Id. The McDonnell Douglas Court described various factors that a
plaintiff could set forth when offering proof that the justification was pretextual. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05. This includes asking whether other employees
were also terminated for engaging in the same or similar acts. Id. at 804. While employers
may fire employees for actions such as participating in protests, they must do so equally to
all employees. Id. The plaintiff may also set forth evidence regarding the employer‘s
general treatment of the plaintiff and the employer‘s general practice regarding
employment of racial minorities. Id. at 804–05.
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Over the years, the courts wrestled with how to apply this three-step
procedure to Title VII cases involving allegations of race-gender
discrimination.70 First, the courts had to decide whether a group based
on race-gender identity could constitute a cognizable class.71 This was
not the first time the courts were asked to determine whether Title VII
addresses discrimination based on more than one aspect of a person‘s
identity. Previously, some courts adopted a ―sex-plus‖ analysis for
addressing claims of discrimination based on a subsection of gender. 72
See infra notes 71, 76–80 (recounting the plight of Title VII plaintiffs bringing racegender-based claims). Issues arose, due to the fact that race and gender are overlapping
categories, even before Title VII was signed into law. See Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 10–
11 (describing the debates that occurred during the drafting of Title VII). For example,
when determining whether to add sex as a protected status under the bill, Representatives
disagreed as to whether black women would be protected if race alone were included in
the Act. Id. One Representative, concerned that black women would receive more rights
than white women, stated, ―[I]f you do not add sex to this bill . . . you are going to try to
take colored men and colored women and give them equal employment rights, and down
at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at all.‖ Id. at 11 (citing
E.E.O.C., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VI AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3218
(1968)).
71
DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 483–84 (8th Cir. 1977)
(examining a case in which the district court held that black women could not bring a Title
VII claim alleging discrimination based on their race-gender identity). In DeGraffenreid, the
trial court stated that permitting plaintiffs to bring race-gender-based claims would allow
plaintiffs to create a ―super-remedy‖ that was not intended by the drafters of Title VII. Id.
at 483. The appellate court noted that it did not entirely agree with the district court‘s
decision not to recognize race-gender claims, but it affirmed the decision on the basis that
the complaint failed to state a Title VII claim because the seniority system at issue was
facially neutral. Id. at 484; see also Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Women of Color and
Employment Discrimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159,
160–61 (1993) (discussing combined race-gender claims and Title VII); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 148 (discussing
the courts‘ failure to acknowledge race-gender identity); Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and
Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1463 (2009) (noting the
difficulty courts have experienced when addressing complex bias claims).
72
See Bryant v. Int‘l Schs. Servs, Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 573 n.18 (―A sex-plus problem arises
whenever an employer adds a criterion or factor for one sex [e.g., marital status], which is
not added for the other sex.‖) (citation omitted); cf. McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F.
Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (sex-plus-a woman with a disabled child); Arnett v. Aspin,
846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (sex-plus-age); infra notes 73–74 (discussing Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc., another sex-plus case). The case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.
is often credited with coining the term ―sex plus.‖ See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., dissenting) (using the term ―sex plus‖ for the
first time to describe discrimination on the basis of gender and an additional unprotected
factor). In Phillips, Ida Phillips filed suit alleging sex discrimination after she applied for a
position with Martin Marietta Corp. and was told that the company would not consider
female applicants who had pre-school age children. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411
F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969). The company would, however, consider male applicants with preschool age children. Id. In its defense, the company claimed it did not discriminate on the
70
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For example, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
explained that an employer could not discriminate against married
women, even though ―married individuals‖ do not constitute a
protected class.73 Simply because the employer was not discriminating
against all women (sex discrimination) did not mean that it had free
reign to discriminate against married women (sex-plus-marriage).74 In
basis of sex; rather, it only discriminated against women with pre-school age children. Id.
at 2–3. The trial court granted defendant‘s motion for summary judgment based on
evidence showing that Martin Marietta Corp. filled 75%–80% of the positions for which
Phillips had applied with women and 70%–75% of the applicants were women. Id. at 1, 2.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and a petition for rehearing en banc was
denied. See Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1258 (denying petition for rehearing). In his dissent from
the denial of the rehearing en banc, Judge Brown criticized the majority‘s analysis. See id.
at 1260 (Brown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority‘s conclusion essentially creates
an either/or test: either the discrimination is based on sex only and is prohibited, or an
additional criterion is added to gender and the discrimination is then permissible). The
Supreme Court eventually vacated and remanded the decision, concluding that the court
should have analyzed this as a question of whether the policy reflected a bona fide
occupational qualification, without commenting on Judge Brown‘s use of the term ―sex
plus.‖ Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
73
444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971) (analyzing discrimination against married females).
In Sprogis, a female stewardess alleged that she was fired because of her sex. Id. at 1196.
The airline company, United, had a policy that all stewardesses must be unmarried. Id.
The policy did not apply to stewards. Id. United argued that their policy did not draw a
distinction between men and women, but rather it merely distinguished between
individuals who were employed as stewardesses. Id. at 1197. The court rejected that
argument and cited a determination by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
stating that even if the discrimination is directed only at a subsection of one gender, it is
still discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. at 1197–98.
74
Id. at 1198 (―The effect of [Title VII] is not to be diluted because discrimination
adversely affects only a portion of the protected class.‖). The sex-plus analysis has not
been adopted by the courts when applying traditional equal protection analysis. See
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974) (applying rational basis review to a legislative
classification based on pregnancy). The Geduldig Court explained that discrimination based
on pregnancy divided individuals into two groups: pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons. Id. Since women were on both sides of the equation, this did not constitute sex
discrimination. Id. at 496–97. Geduldig was subsequently overruled by the enactment of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). The Supreme Court relied on Geduldig in Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic, where the Court considered whether the actions of a group aimed at
preventing women‘s access to clinics that perform abortions demonstrated a form of sexbased discrimination. See Bray v. Alexandria Women‘s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269–70
(1993) (holding that opposition to abortion cannot be considered sex-based discrimination).
Bray has not been overturned. The level of scrutiny to be applied when analyzing equal
protection claims of combined race-gender discrimination has not explicitly been resolved
by the courts and both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny have been advocated by
commentators. Compare Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 24–34, 35 (proposing strict scrutiny
for discrimination against black women), with Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All Male Black
Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV.
2003, 2028 (1992) (advocating the use of intermediate scrutiny when analyzing
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these early sex-plus cases, the ―plus‖ factor was an unprotected criterion,
such as marital status or whether the individual had preschool-age
children.75
The judiciary eventually expanded the sex-plus doctrine to racegender groups.76 In Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly expanded the sex-plus doctrine
to permit a black female to bring a claim alleging discrimination based
on her sex-plus-race.77 The court first noted that the text of Title VII
discrimination against African American females who are prevented from attending an allmale, all-black school).
75
See Arnett, 846 F. Supp at 1239 (explaining that sex-plus ―allows plaintiffs to bring a
Title VII claim for sex discrimination if they can demonstrate that the defendant
discriminated against a subclass of women (or men) based on either (1) an immutable
characteristic or (2) the exercise of a fundamental right‖). The Arnett court concluded that
age is an immutable characteristic and upheld a sex-plus-age claim. Id. at 1241; see also
supra notes 72–74 (illustrating the traditional use of sex-plus analysis).
76
Cf. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing a Title
VII claim of race-plus-sex); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind.
1984) (same); see also infra notes 77–80 (addressing the expansion of sex-plus analysis).
Notably, in Judge Brown‘s dissent in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the first case to use
the term ―sex-plus,‖ Judge Brown seemed to take for granted the fact that courts would
prohibit discrimination based on sex plus a protected criterion. See 416 F.2d at 1260 n.10
(Brown, J., dissenting) (―Of course the ‗plus‘ could not be one of the other statutory
categories of race, religion, national origin, etc.‖). The sex-plus doctrine has been further
extended beyond simply race-gender groups to encompass groups comprised of more than
two categories. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n.16, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing the combination of race, gender, and national origin as a protected class under
Title VII, consequently broadening sex-plus to a type of sex-plus-plus). The Lam court
explained that the lower court failed to recognize the type of discrimination at issue. Id.
The court opined, ―Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared
neither by Asian men nor by white women.‖ Id. at 1562. Thus, discrimination based on
multiple categories of one‘s identity cannot not be accurately analyzed by dissecting the
identity and treating it as separate claims of discrimination. Id. The court found that the
lower court needed to determine whether Lam‘s employer discriminated on the basis of
her combined identity, regardless of whether the employer discriminated on the basis of
race or sex. Id. Not all courts have been willing to expand the sex-plus analysis beyond
two categories. See, e.g., Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (limiting the
Jefferies analysis to the combination of two protected immutable traits). Similarly, in Luce v.
Dalton, the court refused to permit a combined discrimination claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (―ADEA‖). 166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(declining to recognize claims of ―age-plus-religion‖ or ―age-plus-disability‖
discrimination under the ADEA). In determining that the ADEA does not recognize ―ageplus-religion‖ or ―age-plus-disability‖ discrimination, the court explained that Congress
did not intend to permit plaintiffs to combine discrimination statutes. Id. Furthermore,
discrimination based on criterion such as age or disability is fundamentally different than
that based on race or gender; there are unique discriminatory biases against race-gender
subgroups that are not faced by individuals based on other subgroup membership. Id.
77
615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980). In Jefferies, the court held that Jefferies, a black
female, could bring a discrimination suit even if she could not prove discrimination on the
basis of race or sex. Id. First, the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s holding that
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includes the word ―or‖ when listing the protected classes, which means
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination based on any or all of the
classes described.78 Next, the court discussed the history of sex-plus
jurisprudence and concluded that it would be ―beyond belief‖ for the
courts to prohibit an employer from discriminating on the basis of sex
plus a neutral factor but allow employers to discriminate on the basis of
sex-plus-race.79 Additionally, the court noted that the recognition of
race-gender subgroups is essential to remedying discrimination against
black females.80
Currently, the number of race-gender and other complex claims of
discrimination are increasing. 81 Nonetheless, complex discrimination
Jefferies‘s claim of race discrimination failed because a black male was given the position to
which Jefferies applied. Id. at 1030. Second, the trial court had determined that Jefferies‘s
sex discrimination claim failed because females held sixteen of the thirty-six supervisory
positions and one female was a field representative. Id. at 1030–31. The appellate court
remanded the sex discrimination issue, finding that the trial court failed to undergo a
proper legal analysis and made insufficient findings of fact. Id. at 1031. Third, the trial
court never addressed Jefferies‘s claim of race-gender discrimination. Id. at 1032. The
appellate court instructed the trial court to consider on remand whether Jefferies was
discriminated against because of her race-gender identity. Id. at 1034. Also, when
analyzing the race-gender claim, the trial court was instructed to consider only evidence
pertaining to the number of black females hired or promoted. Id. The court was instructed
to ignore evidence pertaining to the hiring or promotion of black males or white females
because they are not within the plaintiff‘s protected class. Id. Thus, the court expanded
sex-plus jurisprudence to permit claims of discrimination based on sex-plus-race. Id.
78
Id. at 1032 (examining the use of the word ―or‖ in the text of Title VII). Also, the court
explained that the House of Representatives rejected an amendment to Title VII that would
have added the word ―solely‖ to the statute, evidencing an intent to extend protection to all
combinations of protected categories. Id.
79
Id. at 1034. The court explained that employers cannot discriminate against women
with young children, but, technically, being a parent to a young child is a ―neutral‖ factor.
Id. In contrast, Title VII explicitly forbids the use of race as a criterion for employment. Id.
It would be illogical to prohibit discrimination based on sex and a neutral factor, but allow
discrimination based on sex and race. Id.
80
Id. at 1034. The expansion of protection to race-gender groups using the sex-plus
analysis is not without its critics. See Pamela J. Smith, Part II—Romantic Paternalism—The
Ties that Bind: Hierarchies of Economic Oppression that Reveal Judicial Disaffinity for Black
Women and Men, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 181, 225 (1999) (explaining that the adoption of
the sex-plus analysis still falls short of fully recognizing black women‘s experiences).
81
Kotkin, supra note 71, at 1450–52. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (―E.E.O.C.‖) reports the number of discrimination charges filed each year and
publishes them on the E.E.O.C. website. See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2009,
EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2010). The E.E.O.C. organizes the charges by type of discrimination alleged, and
notes that ―the number of total charges for any given fiscal year will be less than the total of
the eight types of discrimination listed‖ because individuals may allege multiple forms of
discrimination in their charge. Id. Professor Kotkin explains that overall ―there are 20
percent more claims of discrimination than charges, and the percentage is increasing.‖
Kotkin, supra note 71, at 1451.
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claims fail more often than claims of discrimination based on a single
ground.82 Minna J. Kotkin, a Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School,
explains that even though the McDonnell-Douglas procedure has been
interpreted to permit plaintiffs to bring complex claims of employment
discrimination, plaintiffs alleging complex forms of discrimination have
a more difficult time demonstrating that the employer‘s neutral
justification is pretext for discrimination. 83 For example, a plaintiff may
try to show that other similarly situated employees who are members of
the plaintiff‘s class also experienced discrimination. 84 This is more
difficult for a plaintiff in a complex discrimination case because the
group of individuals who are members of the plaintiff‘s class is likely to
be smaller than it would be if the claim were race- or gender-based.85
Professor Kotkin proposes that in order for complex claims of
discrimination to prevail, additional evidence must be admitted
regarding the alleged discrimination and courts must become cognizant
of the stereotypes that form the basis for complex discrimination. 86
In the same way that courts have had to address race-gender
discrimination in Title VII cases, the courts must now decide how to
address race-gender discrimination in the context of jury selection. 87 The
next section of this Note outlines the growing debate as to whether racegender identity is a permissible basis for peremptory challenges.88
C. Race-Gender Identity and Peremptory Challenges
The courts have struggled to determine whether they should permit
litigants to peremptorily strike potential jurors on the basis of the jurors‘
race-gender identity.89 This issue is not solely the courts‘ concern;
Id. at 1457–58.
Id. at 1490–91.
84
Id. at 1492.
85
Id. at 1493. Additionally, plaintiffs may try to show that a similarly situated employee
from a different race-gender group received favorable treatment. Id. at 1491. In a racegender-based claim, the individual to whom the plaintiff is compared must not be a
member of the plaintiffs race-gender group, racial group, or gender. Id. at 1492. Thus, it
makes it easier for the employer to demonstrate that individuals who were not outside the
plaintiff‘s race-gender group received favorable treatment, combating the plaintiff‘s
allegation that individuals outside the plaintiff‘s race-gender group did receive favorable
treatment. Id. at 1491–92. Professor Kotkin also asserts that merely applying an
intersectional framework when analyzing Title VII cases does no more than restate the
problem. Id. at 1481.
86
Id. at 1497.
87
See infra Part II.C (reviewing caselaw regarding race-gender-based peremptory
strikes).
88
See infra Part II.C (examining the issue of race-gender discrimination).
89
See infra Part II.C.1–2 and accompanying text (surveying cases discussing whether to
recognize combinations of gender and racial groups). Notably, courts have explicitly
82
83
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members of the general public have questioned whether their personal
identity consisting of their race and gender should be recognized and
protected by the courts.90 Currently, some courts prohibit race-gender
discrimination while others do not.91 The following subsection of this
questioned whether combined race-gender groups are protected under Batson and J.E.B. for
over fourteen years, unfortunately, without much response. See Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d
807, 812 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (―[T]he
issue of whether African-American men could constitute a Batson class likely is worthy of
consideration in light of recent holdings that gender as well as race is an impermissible
basis for peremptory challenges . . . .‖); see also United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1291
n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (―[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that whether Batson applies to
combined race-gender groups is a question that merits a determination at some
point . . . .‖); Jean Montoya, ―What’s So Magic[al] About Black Women?‖ Peremptory Challenges
at the Intersection of Race and Gender, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 369, 412 (1996) (advocating
recognition of race-gender groups).
90
See Olin, supra note 7 (describing his experience being called for jury duty in Newark
and being excused from the jury by a litigant). Olin implies that his racial and gender
identity played a role in his excusal, further claiming that ―[d]iscrimination against middleaged white men raises no constitutional eyebrow.‖ Id.; see also Kevin Sack, Research Guided
Jury Selection in Church Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2001, at A12. Sack describes the
trial of a former Ku Klux Klan member alleged to have been involved in a church bombing.
Sack, supra at A12. Sack emphasizes that the prosecution, with the guidance of a
professional jury consultant, exercised its peremptory challenges in a way to create a jury
that lacked white male jurors. Id.
91
See infra Part II.C.1–2 (identifying courts that have recognized or refrained from
recognizing race-gender groups as protected from discrimination during litigants‘ exercise
of peremptory challenges). Not all jurisdictions have taken a stand on whether race-gender
groups are protected for purposes of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Cooperwood v.
Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the court has yet to address the
issue of whether African American males constitute a cognizable group); Ross v.
Mississippi, 16 So. 3d 47, 59 (Miss. App. 2009) (noting that the Mississippi courts have not
yet determined whether race-gender identity is a cognizable group for purposes of the first
step of the Batson procedure). For example, in Ross v. Mississippi, Shirley Ross, an African
American female, was convicted of aggravated assault for pouring grease and hot water on
her husband. 16 So. 3d at 51–52. Ross appealed on the basis that, among other claims, her
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because her counsel failed to object to the
State‘s peremptory challenges of African American females. Id. at 58–59. Although the
court held that Ross was barred from raising the issue, the appellate court noted in dicta
that it noticed a discriminatory pattern on the basis of race and gender. Id. at 59. The court
articulated the pattern as follows:
[T]he State used four peremptory challenges to remove three black
females from the venire, along with a white male. The State tendered
six black males, one white male, and five white females to the defense,
which utilized its challenges to remove three of the black males, and
the white male. The State then challenged another black female, and
accepted a white male, a black male, and a white female. The defense
used its two remaining peremptory challenges to remove two males,
one white and one black. The State used its final challenge to remove a
white female.
Id. at 59 n.9. Furthermore, while some courts have not explicitly stated they will recognize
the race-gender combination, some decisions imply that the court recognizes the
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Note identifies the various analyses employed by courts in determining
whether to permit race-gender-based peremptory challenges.92
1.

Courts That Prohibit Race-Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges

Courts holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids race-genderbased peremptory challenges fall into two categories.93 Courts in the
first category hold that Batson and J.E.B. already encompass the hybrid
group of race and gender.94 Courts in the second category explain that
Batson and J.E.B. do not already encompass the hybrid group of race and
gender, but these courts have expanded the reach of Batson and J.E.B. to

combination. See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 708 So. 2d 220, 226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)
(explaining that certain peremptory strikes exercised by the State to exclude black male
potential jurors were not supported by the record and thus must have been ―predicated on
either race or gender, or both,‖ implying that if a strike is employed on the basis of a
combination of race and gender, the strike violates equal protection); Blair v. State, 476
S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ga. 1996) (concluding that the defendant failed to offer race and gender
neutral justifications for removing six out of seven white female jurors, thus violating
Batson and J.E.B. requirements).
92
See infra Part II.C.1–2 (explaining why some courts have recognized combined racegender groups while others have not).
93
See infra notes 94–95 (identifying the two main analyses courts have applied when
holding that peremptory challenges may not be based on race-gender identity).
94
See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 878 A.2d 1273, 1276–77 (D.C. 2005) (reversing the
trial court‘s ruling that race-gender classifications are not suspect categories and therefore
not protected under Batson and J.E.B.); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that striking a ―southern male‖ from the jury violated J.E.B. because it is
unconstitutional to discriminate on the basis of gender, and therefore equally
unconstitutional to discriminate on the basis of a subsection of gender); State v. Sanderson,
898 P.2d 483, 489 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the trial court‘s finding of a prima facie
showing of discrimination on the basis of gender and race was not clearly erroneous); State
v. Daniels, 122 P.3d 796, 801 (Haw. 2005) (holding that Caucasian males constitute a
cognizable group under Batson). In Lucas, the court cited to Sanderson for the proposition
that a combination of race and gender can be considered cognizable for purposes of Batson.
Lucas, 18 P.3d. at 163. The court noted, however, that the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court have refrained from prohibiting race-gender-based peremptory challenges. Id. At
least one court‘s decision, which seems to forbid race-gender-based peremptory challenges,
has caused confusion due to its ambiguously articulated holding. See Lammers v. State,
959 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Ark. 1998) (affirming the trial court‘s decision to recognize a prima facie
case of discrimination where the defendant used his peremptory challenges to strike white
males from the jury). A Massachusetts court understood the Lammers decision to have been
decided based on an allegation of race-based discrimination, Commonwealth v. Jordan, 785
N.E.2d 368, 379 n.13 (Mass. 2003), while the Lammers dissent noted that the Batson challenge
was actually based on a combination of race, gender, and age. See Lammers, 959 S.W.2d at
37 (Thornton, J., dissenting) (―Clearly the Batson challenge to Lammers‘s peremptory strike
could not be sustained solely on the basis of [the challenged juror] being white.‖).
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specifically recognize a discrete, cognizable group based on race-gender
identity.95
On the surface, the two approaches seem similar inasmuch as they
arrive at the same conclusion. For example, in Robinson v. United States,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained it was unnecessary
to decide whether black females constitute a group that should receive
heightened scrutiny.96
The relevant question was whether
discrimination against this group involves discrimination on the basis of
race, which is prohibited by Batson, and discrimination on the basis of
gender, which is prohibited by J.E.B.97 The court concluded that
peremptory challenges aimed at black women violate both Batson and
J.E.B.98
See, e.g., People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 181 (Cal. 1985) (holding that black women
constitute a cognizable group); State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 2008) (denying
review of an appellate court decision reversing defendant Whitby‘s conviction on the basis
that the court failed to require the State to offer a race-neutral justification for striking a
white male juror). As Florida law currently stands, Florida‘s Melbourne procedure for
peremptory challenges applies to groups based on the combination of race and gender.
Whitby, 975 So. 2d at 1133 (Cantero, J., dissenting). Judge Cantero explained that
because, as the district court in this case found, Melbourne applies even
to white male jurors, and because every individual necessarily belongs
to one distinct racial group or another, theoretically an attorney could
object to every single peremptory challenge—whether the juror is
white or black, male or female—without ever providing a reason for
believing the challenge [was] racially motivated.
Id.; see also People v. Jerome, 828 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that black
males are a cognizable group for the same reason set forth in People v. Garcia, 636 N.Y.S.2d
370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)); People v. Garcia, 636 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(holding that to decide black females are not cognizable would mean they do not have a
right to full participation in the administration of justice); see also Ross, 16 So. 3d at 59
(noting that the litigant would need to argue that the State should expand Batson to include
race-gender-based groups if Mississippi were ever to hold race-gender-based challenges
unconstitutional). At least one court has held that a juror‘s race-gender identity is a
prohibited basis for a peremptory challenge without articulating its justification for the
holding. See State v. Shepherd, 989 P.2d 503, 511 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the
idea that race and gender is not protected, as held by the trial court, was erroneous).
96
See 878 A.2d at 1284 (explaining that race-gender groups are already protected under
Batson and its progeny).
97
Id. ―[T]he critical question is whether the purposeful use of peremptory strikes to
exclude black females . . . involves racial and/or gender discrimination. If it does, then it
offends basic principles of equal protection and is prohibited under Batson and J.E.B.‖ Id.
98
Id. ―Two bad partial reasons for a peremptory strike do not add up to a good reason;
they simply equate to a reason that is doubly bad.‖ Id. The court explained it was not
necessary to show the opposing party‘s peremptory challenge was motivated only by race
or gender because such a requirement would not reflect reality as motivations behind
peremptory strikes are often diverse. Id. In reaching this decision, the court used a
―tainted‖ analysis, explaining that even if some of the reasons for the challenge were
neutral, a single discriminatory justification would taint the entire challenge. See supra
notes 45–47 (explaining the difference between tainted and dual motivation analyses).
95
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In contrast, the California Supreme Court held that race-gender
identity is an impermissible basis for peremptory challenges as a
necessary expansion of Batson, rather than holding that Batson and J.E.B.
already prohibit race-gender discrimination.99 The court explained that
race-gender identity influences the jurors‘ life experiences.100 Thus,
striking jurors because of their race-gender identity would impair the
impartiality of the jury.101 Moreover, expanding Batson to race-gender
99
See Motton, 704 P.2d at 181 (holding that peremptorily striking potential jurors on the
basis of their race-gender identity must be prohibited); see also Montoya, supra note 89, at
403 (using an intersectional theory framework to expand Batson to race-gender groups).
100
Motton, 704 P.2d at 181; see also Wanda A. Hendricks, On the Margins: Creating a Space
and Place in the Academy, in TELLING HISTORIES: BLACK WOMEN HISTORIANS IN THE IVORY
TOWER 146, 146–57 (Deborah Gray White ed., 2008) (discussing the way the author‘s past
life experiences, race, and gender have influenced her life and led her to a career in
academia). Hendricks, a professor, explains that the way her students have reacted to her
has been profoundly influenced by her race-gender identity. See id. at 154–55. For
example, when Hendricks taught a course on United States history, her white students
were surprised that a black female professor would be ―teach[ing] them ‗their‘ history.‖ Id.
at 154. Hendricks also explains that her race-gender identity played a role, not only in her
communication and dealings with students, but also in her relationships with other faculty
members. Id. at 153. She notes that certain responsibilities were passed on to her because
she was a junior faculty member and a black woman. Id. at 153–54. For example,
Hendricks explains that ―as a member of graduate committees of African American
students or students working on African American topics, I have been coerced into
becoming the lead reader while the tenured professor received primary credit.‖ Id. at 153.
Mia Bay also describes the way her race and gender have influenced her life by discussing
her personal history and her mother‘s history. See Mia Bay, Looking Backward in Order to Go
Forward: Black Women Historians and Black Women’s History, in TELLING HISTORIES: BLACK
WOMEN HISTORIANS IN THE IVORY TOWER, supra, at 182, 183–94 (describing Bay‘s discovery
of African American women‘s history and how Bay‘s mother‘s history has influenced her
life). Bay, a history major, did not become aware of African American women‘s history
until she was a graduate student at Yale. Id. at 191. It was not until the early 1990‘s that
black feminist texts and historians began calling for more attention to be paid to black
women‘s history. Id. at 192. Bay also notes that even with the progress that has been made
in the field of black women‘s history, the field is still often overlooked outside the realm of
African American and women‘s history. Id. at 194.
101
See Motton, 704 P.2d at 181–82 (justifying the expansion of Batson to black women).
Although some California judges have accepted that race-gender identity influences one‘s
life experiences, at least one judge has doubted whether the courts have gathered sufficient
evidence to support this assertion. Compare id. (opining that black women as a group
possess a unique variety of human experiences and discrimination against them during
jury selection affects the jury‘s ability ―‗to achieve an overall impartiality‘ in their decisionmaking processes‖) (citing People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (Cal. 1978)), and People v.
Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852–53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (expanding Motton and deeming
African American males a cognizable group without additional analysis), with People v.
Young, 105 P.3d 487, 542–43 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining that the court
lacks evidence to support the proposition that black women are subject to a unique form of
discrimination and further explaining that whether certain groups are cognizable depends
on the definition of ―cognizable group,‖ which has not been clearly articulated by the
California or federal courts).
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groups is justified in the sense that, like groups based on race or gender,
certain race-gender groups share a history of past discrimination. 102

102
See Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 25–30 (examining the past history of discrimination
against black women). Scales-Trent emphasizes that discrimination experienced by black
women during slavery was qualitatively different than that experienced by black men. See
id. at 26. She notes that some pre-Civil War statutes were applied specifically to black
women rather than distinguishing between groups on the sole basis of race or gender. Id.
at 27. For example, Scales-Trent notes that a 1643 Virginia statute defined ―tithable
persons‖ as ―those who worked the ground.‖ Id. This group specifically encompassed all
adult men and black women. Id. Scales-Trent also describes the history of political
powerlessness of black women, noting that they had to fight for the right to vote twice, first
as blacks and second as women. Id. at 30. Even after obtaining the right to vote, black
women were often required to wait to register to vote until white women had done so and
they were forced to pay special taxes that were imposed only on black women. Id. at 32; see
also Smith, supra note 80, at 188–205 (examining the economic exploitation of black women
before and after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued); Vernetta D. Young & Zoe
Spencer, Multiple Jeopardy: The Impact of Race, Gender, and Slavery on the Punishment of
Women in Antebellum America, in RACE, GENDER & PUNISHMENT: FROM COLONIALISM TO THE
WAR ON TERROR 65, 66–67 (Mary Bosworth & Jeanne Flavin eds., 2007) (examining the way
in which race-gender identity influenced the punishment of both white and black women
in antebellum America). Smith discusses the interplay of race and gender throughout her
article, explaining that
race is a powerful advantage for White women that is not wholly
diminished by their gender. Black wom[e]n have wanted White
women to see that when race is taken into account, Black women‘s
experiences are fundamentally different in all respects from White
women‘s experiences. . . . Consequently, whether women are valued as
mothers, wives or laborers is very much dependent upon their
race/gender subgroup.
Smith, supra note 80, at 194.
This past history of discrimination continues to influence the lives of members of
many race-gender groups today. Cf. Cleopatra Howard Caldwell, Barbara J. Guthrie &
James S. Jackson, Identity Development, Discrimination, and Psychological Well-Being Among
African American and Caribbean Black Adolescents, in GENDER, RACE, CLASS, & HEALTH:
INTERSECTIONAL APPROACHES 163, 166 (Amy J. Schulz & Leith Mullings eds., 2006)
(explaining that America‘s history of racism and slavery continue to affect many African
Americans today); Cecilia A. Conrad, Changes in the Labor Market Status of Black Women,
1960–2000, in AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 157, 157–61 (Cecilia A. Conrad,
John Whitehead, Patrick Mason & James Stewart, eds., 2005) (chronicling the great
economic progress experienced by black women between 1960 to 1980 and suggesting
factors that have led to the slowing of economic advancement of black women between
1980 to 2000); Pamela Braboy Jackson & David R. Williams, The Intersection of Race, Gender,
and SES: Health Paradoxes, in GENDER, RACE, CLASS, & HEALTH, supra, at 141 (identifying the
unique stereotypes that African American women face in the workplace); Montoya, supra
note 89, at 397–98 (identifying empirical research establishing a correlation between an
individual‘s combined racial and gender identity and other life experiences, such as living
in poverty). For example, Montoya cites to one study finding that white men were able to
purchase a car at a lower price than white women, black men, and black women, despite
the fact that the study participants used the same bargaining strategies. Montoya, supra
note 89, at 397; see also Smith, supra note 80, at 256 (analyzing the judiciary‘s past treatment
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Permitting race-gender-based peremptory strikes condones prejudicial
stereotypes about race-gender groups.103 Part III of this Note discusses
the consequences of using either of these two approaches. 104
In addition, a few courts have deemed race-gender groups protected
from discrimination during jury selection without using either of the two
analyses outlined above.105 Massachusetts, for example, concluded that
race-gender identity is an impermissible basis for peremptory challenges
based on its state constitution. 106 The Massachusetts Constitution
demands that a litigant be offered a jury of his peers.107 Therefore, in
order to have a representative jury, litigants are prohibited from
exercising race-gender-based strikes.108 Not all courts, however, have
concluded that race-gender identity is an impermissible basis for

of black women and black men). Smith describes race-gender groups in a hierarchical
relation to one another as follows:
As to those who have been historically and traditionally oppressed,
when quantitative access to the economic markets are taken into
account, White women are on top of the hierarchy, followed by Black
women and Black men respectively.
All, however, remain
economically subordinate to the White male, the subgroup most
protected by and benefitting from judicial affinity.
Smith, supra note 80, at 256.
103
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141–42 (1994) (―All persons . . . have the right not
to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that
reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination.‖); see also supra note 23
(explaining that stereotypes about a group based on combinations of attributes are often
much richer than stereotypes aimed at a broader group).
104
See infra Part III (analyzing the approaches currently applied when considering
objections to allegedly race-gender-based peremptory challenges).
105
See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (describing the way Massachusetts has
looked to its state constitution when considering race-gender-based peremptory strikes).
106
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 785 N.E.2d 368, 378–79, 380 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing a
wealth of uncertainty in the federal and state courts as to whether they should recognize
combined race-gender groups, but stating that article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution
requires that Massachusetts protect this combination); see also State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d
40, 50 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that discrimination on the basis of race and gender is
prohibited). State v. Gonzales was decided prior to J.E.B. and therefore the court made its
decision based on the Equal Protection Clause and the New Mexico Constitution. Gonzales,
808 P.2d at 44–50. The Gonzales court held that Hispanics and males were cognizable
groups—Hispanics due to Batson, and males due to the state constitution. Id. Therefore,
using peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic males from the jury based on their racegender identity was impermissible. Id. at 50.
107
MASS. CONST. art. XII.
108
See Jordan, 785 N.E.2d at 380 (holding that race-gender discrimination is forbidden by
the Massachusetts Constitution).
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peremptory challenges.109 The next subsection discusses the reasoning
employed by these courts.110
2.

Courts That Allow Race-Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges

Some courts do not prohibit race-gender discrimination during jury
selection.111 In People v. Washington, an Illinois appellate court refused to
recognize black men as a cognizable group, fearing recognition of
subgroups would result in an explosion of hybrid subcategories,
Other courts,
essentially abolishing the peremptory challenge. 112
although not expressly rejecting the idea of recognizing race-gender
groups, have implied that they will not recognize them.113
See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (identifying decisions holding that
jurors‘ race-gender identities are not protected from discrimination during jury selection).
110
See infra Part II.C.2 (examining the analysis used to conclude that race-gender-based
challenges are permissible).
111
See People v. Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (declining to
consider ―black men‖ a cognizable group for purposes of Batson). Notably, People v.
Washington was decided prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in J.E.B. See supra notes 54–
59 and accompanying text (describing J.E.B. v. Alabama, which held that gender is an
impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge). The Washington court noted, however,
that the Illinois Constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender. Washington,
628 N.E.2d at 355. Thus, the court‘s analysis demonstrates that even if J.E.B. were to have
been decided before People v. Washington, the result likely would have been the same. See
id. at 355–56 (explaining that the defendant is not arguing that the jurors were struck solely
on the basis of race or solely on the basis of gender, but rather the jurors were struck on the
basis of their race-gender identity). Furthermore, in People v. Harris, the Illinois Supreme
Court expanded on People v. Washington and refused to extend Batson to combined racial or
ethnic groups. See People v. Harris, 647 N.E.2d 893, 904 (Ill. 1994) (explaining that
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination against jurors who are members of one
race, such as African American jurors, does not also establish a prima facie case of
discrimination against jurors of other racial or ethnic backgrounds, such as Hispanic
jurors); see also United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to
acknowledge race-gender discrimination); United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding that black males are not a cognizable group). But see J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130 n.1 (1994) (noting that Nichols refused to extend Batson to
gender without mentioning the issue of combined race-gender identity). In light of the fact
that the J.E.B. Court refrained from noting that Nichols involved combined race-gender
discrimination, this author suggests that it is possible the Supreme Court believed it had
resolved this issue by prohibiting gender-based strikes.
112
628 N.E.2d at 356. People v. Washington may have been resolved differently had the
court decided to prohibit race-gender discrimination. In that case, the State excused two
black males from the jury during jury selection. Id. at 352. The judge held that this did not
constitute a prima facie showing of race discrimination because black women were still on
the venire. Id. Consequently, the trial jury included six white males, one white female, and
five black females. Id. at 352–53. No black males sat on the jury or served as alternate
jurors. Id.
113
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 808 A.2d 388, 397–98 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the
prosecution‘s justifications for striking two black males from the jury were race-neutral and
109
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This divergence in views as to whether peremptory challenges may
be based on race-gender identity stems partly from the United States
Supreme Court‘s avoidance of the issue. In fact, as discussed in the next
subsection of this Note, the Court recently missed the opportunity to
acknowledge the challenges courts have faced when determining
whether to prohibit race-gender-based challenges.114
3.

The Supreme Court‘s Missed Opportunity to Take Notice of This
Issue

Rivera v. Illinois illustrates the uncertainty of whether race-gender
groups are cognizable under Batson.115 Rivera was found guilty of firstdegree murder and appealed, asserting that the judge improperly raised
a Batson challenge sua sponte when Rivera peremptorily challenged a
female African American juror.116 The judge never articulated the basis
for his objection, but Rivera alleged the objection was based on an
inference of race-gender discrimination.117 Rivera also claimed that racetherefore the trial court was correct in denying the defendant‘s objection to the
prosecution‘s peremptory challenge); State v. Dressner, No. 2008-KA-1366, 2010 WL
2723706, at *21 (La. July 6, 2010) (explaining that the defense used five out of six
peremptory challenges to excuse white males, and the trial court analyzed this as a racebased challenge). In these decisions, the courts analyzed Batson challenges as though only
race discrimination were involved; however, the evidence set forth by the parties suggested
that the challenges were race-gender-based. See Jackson, 808 A.2d at 399 (―The defendants
contend that the questions asked of [the challenged juror] were dissimilar to the questions
asked of other venirepersons and were actually motivated by his gender and race.‖). This
author suggests that the courts‘ decisions to analyze only race discrimination, as opposed
to race-gender discrimination, may indicate that these courts do not prohibit race-genderbased challenges.
114
See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the Illinois race-gender peremptory challenge case and
the Supreme Court‘s response).
115
See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1451–52 (2009) (noting that the Illinois courts
disagreed as to whether the peremptory challenge at issue should have been analyzed as
gender- or race-gender-based).
116
People v. Rivera, 810 N.E.2d 129, 130–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Rivera claimed that he
wanted to excuse the juror because she worked at a clinic that treated victims of gunshot
wounds. People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 788 (Ill. 2006). The court interrupted Rivera and
noted that the juror appeared to be African American. Id. Rivera explained that he had
accepted an African American female onto the jury already, but the judge stated that this
juror was the second African American female that Rivera had attempted to eliminate. Id.
Ultimately, the judge refused to sustain the challenge and never clarified which evidence
the judge deemed dispositive of the issue. Id. Rivera requested leave to ask the juror
additional questions, including information about her interactions with victims of gun
violence. Id. After questioning, Rivera again requested to use a peremptory challenge to
excuse the juror. Id. at 788–89. Rivera then stated that he was trying to add men to the jury
because the jury primarily contained women. Id. The judge overruled Rivera‘s request. Id.
117
Rivera, 852 N.E.2d at 789 (noting that the trial court failed to state the basis for raising
the Batson challenge); Rivera, 810 N.E.2d at 136 (describing the basis for Rivera‘s appeal).
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gender-based strikes are permitted.118 The appellate court never reached
the issue of whether race-gender-based strikes are allowed, but the
dissent opined that Batson‘s focus is on members of a single group, not
combinations of groups.119
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the decision and remanded the
case to determine the basis for the judge‘s objection.120 The court opined
that Batson was most concerned with discrimination on the basis of a
single group membership.121 On remand, the trial judge stated that his
objection was based on an inference of gender discrimination. 122 The
court subsequently found insufficient evidence to establish gender
discrimination; thus, the denial of the challenge was in error. 123
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether reversal is necessary when a litigant is erroneously deprived of
a peremptory challenge.124 The Court held that it is not.125 The Court
Rivera, 810 N.E.2d at 136 (―Defendant argues inter alia that combined race-gender
discrimination cannot form the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination.‖).
119
See id. (explaining that any issues arising out of the first step of the Batson procedure
were moot); see also id. at 144 (Frossard, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Batson‘s prime
concern is discrimination on the basis of a single group).
120
Rivera, 852 N.E.2d at 791.
121
Id. at 779–80. To support this assertion, the court cited to People v. Washington, an
appellate court case holding that Batson does not extend to race-gender groups. Id. at 779.
Further, the court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court cited to People v. Washington when
it refused to extend Batson protection to groups comprised of combinations of different
racial or ethnic groups. Id. at 779–80. Additionally, the court considered whether a prima
facie case of race discrimination could be established because the State argued on appeal
that the trial court based its challenge solely on the juror‘s race, not a combination of race
and gender. Id. at 789. The court concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination. Id. at 790.
122
People v. Rivera, 879 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. 2007).
123
Id. at 884. In the beginning of the opinion, the court intimated that it disbelieved the
judge‘s assertion that his objection was based on gender discrimination by noting that the
judge had stated that the juror‘s race was a significant factor in his objection. Id. at 880.
Further, the court criticized the judge for claiming to have based his prima facie showing
on gender discrimination because, although Rivera made a comment about wanting to
increase the number of men on the jury, that comment was not made until after the judge
required Rivera to articulate a reason for the challenge. Id. at 881. The conclusion of the
opinion made it clear that the court felt the judge actually based his objection on race
discrimination or race-gender discrimination. See id. at 884 (―The trial judge‘s statements
during jury selection, frankly, suggested that he believed defense counsel was engaged in
either racial discrimination or combined race-gender discrimination. Otherwise, why
would the judge repeatedly emphasize that [the juror] was African-American?‖).
124
Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1452 (2009) (examining consequences that arise when
a defendant, although tried by an unbiased jury, is erroneously denied a peremptory
challenge).
125
Id. at 1456 (holding that state law determines the ramifications of the erroneous denial
of a peremptory challenge and the Illinois Supreme Court held that reversal was not
required).
118
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also mentioned that the Illinois Supreme Court did not believe the
judge‘s challenge was gender-based but made no mention as to whether
the combination of race and gender is protected under Batson and
J.E.B.126
Overall, courts have come to differing conclusions in determining
whether to recognize race-gender groups as cognizable.127 Some courts
hold that litigants are prohibited from basing a peremptory challenge on
a juror‘s race-gender identity due to Batson‘s prohibition against race
discrimination and J.E.B.‘s prohibition against gender discrimination.128
Other courts reach the same result by expanding Batson to encompass
this additional group.129 In contrast, some courts have held that Batson
and J.E.B. refer only to a single, specific source of discrimination and
refuse to deem race-gender groups cognizable.130 Part III of this Note
will analyze the costs and benefits of these approaches. 131 This Note also
looks to Title VII jurisprudence for guidance in determining whether to
permit race-gender-based strikes.132
III. ANALYSIS
As explained in Part II, courts take different approaches in
determining whether to recognize race-gender groups as cognizable.133
This Part will analyze the costs and benefits of these approaches. 134 Part
III.A explains that the reasons proffered for condoning race-genderbased challenges are unjustified.135 Part III.B and Part III.C both describe
126
Id. at 1452 (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court failed to find evidence of any form
of discrimination). The Court noted that Batson and subsequent cases hold that litigants are
―constitutionally prohibited from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex.‖ See id. at 1451.
127
See supra Part II.C (describing the courts‘ treatment of discrimination on the basis of
combined race-gender groups).
128
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining one justification for recognizing race-gender identity
under Batson and J.E.B.).
129
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing a second justification for recognizing race-gender
identity).
130
See supra Part II.C.2–3 (explaining that some courts have refused to recognize racegender identity as a cognizable group).
131
See infra Part III (critiquing the methods courts have applied when addressing claims
of race and gender discrimination).
132
See infra Part III (applying the lessons learned in the employment law context to the
peremptory challenge realm).
133
See supra Part II.C (describing the courts‘ treatment of discrimination on the basis of
race-gender identity).
134
See infra Part III (discussing whether race-gender groups should be deemed
cognizable for purposes of Batson).
135
See infra Part III.A (dissecting the justifications for permitting race-gender-based
strikes).
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the negative consequences of failing to deem race-gender groups
cognizable.136 Finally, Part III.D explains why Batson must be expanded
to include race-gender groups.137
A. Arguments in Support of Race-Gender-Based Strikes are Unjustified
Some courts have held that race-gender groups are not cognizable.138
Proponents claim this decision is justified by two main contentions. 139
First, the Supreme Court has never stated that race-gender groups are
protected.140 The Court has even expressed reservation about imposing
more limitations on the challenge due to the important interests it
furthers.141 Second, courts are wary of extending protection to additional

136
See infra Part III.B–C (identifying two consequences that arise when combined racegender groups are not protected under Batson: (1) the creation of a loophole permitting
discriminatory peremptory challenges and (2) the destruction of Batson‘s symbolic
significance).
137
See infra Part III.D (advocating the expansion of Batson to race-gender groups).
138
See supra Part II.C.2 (identifying courts that do not recognize race-gender groups as
cognizable).
139
See infra notes 140–55 and accompanying text (describing and critiquing the proffered
justifications for not prohibiting combined race-gender–based strikes).
140
See supra Part II.C.3 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
issue of combined race-gender-based strikes, even after reviewing a case where the issue of
race-gender discrimination was discussed by the lower court); see also People v.
Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize ―black males‖ as
a discrete cognizable group for purposes of Batson). The Illinois Appellate Court explained
as follows:
If we apply the Batson principles at the prima facie stage of the analysis
to subcategories of race and gender, not only will we have created new
hybrid suspect groups, but we will have effectively destroyed both the
peremptory challenge and the Batson decision. . . . ―[I]f the Supreme
Court in Batson had desired, it could have abolished the peremptory
challenge or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of
race, gender, age, or other group classification.‖ We believe, however,
along with several other courts, that ―in light of the important position
of the peremptory challenge in our jury system, the Court intended
Batson to apply to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on
the basis of race only.‖
Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 850
F.2d 1038, 1042, 1042–43 (4th Cir. 1988)).
141
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the courts‘ reluctance to impose
additional limitations on the peremptory challenge); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127,
149–50 (1994) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the decision to prohibit genderbased challenges infringes on the ability of litigants to use the challenge, and in light of the
importance of the peremptory challenge as a litigation tool, advocating that this restriction
apply only to the government‘s peremptory challenges).
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groups for fear that all aspects of jurors‘ identities will eventually be
protected, rendering the challenge useless. 142
The first contention, that the Supreme Court‘s misgivings about
placing limits on peremptory strikes should counsel against prohibition
of race-gender-based strikes, is unjustified.143 The Court has consistently
held that peremptory challenges will be limited as necessary to avoid
equal protection violations.144 Furthermore, the Court has explained that
the first step of Batson is not meant to impose a high burden on
litigants.145 Failing to recognize race-gender groups, however, imposes a
high burden because it makes it more difficult to object to discrimination
on the basis of race or gender, and makes it impossible to object to racegender discrimination.146
The second contention, that recognition of race-gender groups will
result in a slippery slope effectively eliminating the challenge, is also
insufficient to justify not deeming race-gender groups cognizable.147
First, when it becomes necessary to choose between rendering
peremptory challenges useless or risking the violation of equal
protection, the Constitution demands the former. 148 Furthermore, it is

See, e.g., People v. Young, 105 P.3d 487, 542 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring)
(expressing concern that recognition of ―cross-categories‖ as distinct cognizable groups
will lead to an unending combination of cognizable subgroups); supra text accompanying
note 112 (expressing concern that the creation of hybrid groups would destroy Batson).
143
See infra notes 144, 148 (describing the Supreme Court‘s willingness to impose
limitations on peremptory challenges).
144
See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Supreme Court has not refrained from
intruding on litigants‘ peremptory challenge rights in cases implicating equal protection
concerns).
145
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that the first step in Batson imposes a
low burden); see also supra notes 41–42 (recognizing that some states have eliminated the
prima facie showing requirement). In Johnson v. California, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that Batson was meant to address ―suspicions and inferences‖ of
discrimination. 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005). The way in which peremptory challenges are
exercised, without justification, necessarily leaves some uncertainty as to whether the basis
for the challenge is discriminatory. Id. Thus, parties objecting to a peremptory challenge
are permitted to base the objection on an inference to help encourage ―prompt rulings‖ on
Batson challenges, while still addressing and remedying discriminatory jury selection. Id.
146
See infra Part III.B (explaining that race-gender discrimination must be expressly
prohibited in order to fully prevent race-based or gender-based discrimination from
occurring).
147
See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text (asserting that the recognition of
combined race-gender groups as protected will not impose an undue burden on the
courts).
148
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (―[W]ere it
necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury
chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to
challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former.‖) (quoting Swain
142
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unlikely that recognition of race-gender groups would force courts to
spend an overwhelming amount of time reviewing Batson challenges.149
The Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in J.E.B.150 In that
case, the Court emphasized that proving a juror was excluded on the
basis of his membership in a protected group requires that the opposing
party demonstrate that this group membership gave rise to the
challenge.151 If the trial judge determines that the opposing party has not
established a prima facie case, the inquiry ends. 152 The Court also noted
that if an explanation is required, the proponent of the challenge does
not need to offer as thorough of a justification as would be needed to
defend a challenge for cause.153
Additionally, race-gender groups are already recognized as
cognizable in some jurisdictions and those courts have not subsequently
eliminated peremptory challenges due to a proliferation of Batson
hearings.154 In fact, Florida has not only deemed race-gender-based
groups cognizable, but also Florida has completely eliminated the prima
facie requirement at the first step of Batson and peremptory challenges
continue to be an important aspect of the state‘s jury selection process.155
The refusal to prohibit race-gender-based strikes is not only
unjustified, but it also yields detrimental consequences.156 These
consequences include the creation of a loophole permitting equal
protection violations against members of suspect classes and the
destruction of Batson‘s symbolic significance as a message of intolerance
for discrimination.157

v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), overruled by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
149
See infra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
150
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (stating that expanding Batson to
gender-based challenges would not be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial courts).
151
See id. (explaining that courts are capable of barring peremptory challenges based on
gender as evidenced through the courts that have already prohibited peremptory
challenges based on gender).
152
See supra Part II.A (discussing the prima facie requirement).
153
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145.
154
See supra Part II.C.1 (describing the courts that currently recognize race-gender groups
as cognizable).
155
See supra notes 41–42 (discussing Florida‘s procedure for examining Batson
challenges).
156
See infra Part III.B–C (describing the consequences of not recognizing race-gender
groups as cognizable for purposes of Batson).
157
See infra Part III.B–C (describing the loophole created when courts choose not to
recognize race-gender groups as cognizable and examining the implications of not
recognizing race-gender groups on Batson‘s symbolic function).
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B. Preventing Review of Unconstitutional Peremptory Challenges
This Note asserts that race-gender-based challenges violate equal
protection.158 Nonetheless, even if the Supreme Court were to conclude
that peremptory challenges may be based on a juror‘s race-gender
identity, failure to recognize race-gender groups creates a loophole for
race- or gender-based discrimination, which is clearly prohibited.159 The
Supreme Court overturned Swain in Batson because it found that
requiring a litigant to establish a pattern of discriminatory peremptory
challenges over time, rather than using evidence from a single case,
consequently left peremptory challenges ―largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny.‖160 Discrimination on the basis of race, when
combined with gender, becomes immune from scrutiny when litigants
cannot pass the first step of Batson in order to challenge a discriminatory
peremptory strike.161
If race-gender-based challenges are permitted, litigants will be able
to defend against allegations of race-based or gender-based
discrimination by asserting that their peremptory challenges are actually
See infra Part III.D (asserting that equal protection demands that courts prohibit
invidious race-gender discrimination during jury selection).
159
See supra Part II.A (explaining that peremptory challenges may not be based on race or
gender).
160
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1986) (opining that the decision in Swain
made it difficult to object to the exercise of peremptory challenges); see also supra Part II.A
(describing the burden imposed by Swain and the Batson Court‘s response).
161
See supra notes 111–12 (discussing People v. Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993), where the court refused to consider black males cognizable for purposes of Batson).
In People v. Washington, the prosecutor was alleged to have peremptorily challenged black
males from the jury because of their race-gender identity. 628 N.E.2d 351, 352 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993). The defendant, however, could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination
against black males because the trial court refused to deem black males cognizable. Id. at
356. Furthermore, the defendant could not allege race discrimination because black women
were on the jury, which destroyed his prima facie case. Id. at 352. Although no black men
sat on the jury or served as alternates, it was impossible for the defendant to persuade the
court to require that the prosecutor explain the challenges because the court refused to
deem race-gender groups cognizable. See id. at 352–53.
People v. Washington is especially informative when considering that some courts
apply a ―tainted‖ analysis at the second step of the Batson inquiry. See supra notes 45–47
and accompanying text (describing mixed motive and tainted analysis). Under the tainted
analysis, if a single discriminatory basis is stated as a justification for the strike, the
peremptory strike must be denied. Supra note 46. Courts that choose to apply this analysis
may not have the opportunity to do so when a claim is based on race-gender identity
because such a claim may not move past the first step of the Batson inquiry if race-genderbased groups are not cognizable. This is one illustration of the way in which
unconstitutional peremptory challenges, or peremptory strikes that would normally be
denied by a court, escape judicial scrutiny when race-gender identity is not deemed
cognizable.
158
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race-gender-based. Similarly, in J.E.B, the Supreme Court recognized
that a prohibition on the use of gender-based challenges is necessary, not
only because gender is an inappropriate proxy for determining juror
capability, but also because gender should not be used as a pretext for
race discrimination.162 The Court emphasized that race and gender are
overlapping categories, and, as such, lower courts had difficulty
determining whether peremptory challenges were exercised on the basis
of race or the then-permitted basis of gender.163 The Court‘s decision
holding gender protected for Batson purposes was, presumably, meant to
achieve two objectives: to remedy the violation of equal protection
inherent in gender-based strikes and to require courts to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of overlapping categories of race and
gender.164 Failure to recognize race-gender groups creates a loophole for
litigants to use in order to discriminate on the basis of either of two
protected statuses: race or gender.165 In light of the discussion in J.E.B.
regarding the need to close loopholes that allow discrimination, racegender groups must be deemed cognizable. It is of no small significance
that if the failure to deem race-gender groups cognizable results in the
exercise of even a single race- or gender-based challenge, the United
States Constitution has been violated. 166
C. Negating Batson’s Message of Intolerance for Discrimination
The failure to prohibit race-gender-based strikes also destroys
Batson‘s function as a symbol of the judiciary‘s intolerance for

See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994) (explaining that to permit gender-based
peremptory challenges conflicts with the purpose of Batson because it could help to mask
race-based discrimination); see also supra note 55 (noting that gender could be used as an
unconstitutional proxy for discrimination on the basis of race).
163
See supra note 55 (explaining that gender-based peremptory challenges must be
prohibited because they contravene equal protection and could insulate race-based
discrimination from judicial scrutiny).
164
See supra note 55 (explaining that the J.E.B. Court held that peremptory challenges
based on gender violate equal protection and can be used to frustrate the purpose of
Batson). Furthermore, the fact that the Court recently had the opportunity to comment on
whether the combination of race and gender is protected under Batson but refrained from
doing so may illustrate that the Court finds it has already answered the question in the
affirmative. See supra Part II.C.3 (offering an overview of the Supreme Court‘s recent case
regarding peremptory challenges).
165
See supra Part II.A (describing equal protection analysis and explaining that race and
gender are given added protection because of the history of past discrimination against
individuals on the basis of race or sex, thus demanding strict scrutiny and intermediate
scrutiny, respectively).
166
See Walker v. Girdich, 410 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2005) (―[U]nder Batson and its
progeny, striking even a single juror for a discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional.‖).
162
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discrimination.167 As was discussed in the context of Title VII and sexplus jurisprudence, the failure to prohibit race-gender-based
discrimination can be viewed as the law ignoring the importance of racegender identity, arguably an extension or ratification of the law‘s
historically unfair treatment of racial and ethnic minorities and white
women.168 Furthermore, it is illogical to assume that Batson could serve
as a deterrent to discrimination if litigants could avoid its command by
discriminating on the basis of the intersection of a juror‘s race and
gender.169
Even without expanding Batson, some courts have recognized the
combination of race and gender as a cognizable group under the
presumption that Batson and J.E.B. already encompass the race-gender
combination.170 Neglecting to expand Batson, however, and only
recognizing race-gender groups in order to prohibit race or gender
discrimination, rather than race-gender discrimination, fails to
acknowledge that race-gender discrimination is more than sexism or
racism; it is a distinct form of discrimination. 171 Race-gender groups
share the normal indicia of a suspect class. 172 Not only have race-gender
groups historically been the targets of overt discrimination, but also raceSee J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that Batson serves as
―a statement about what this Nation stands for‖) (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479
U.S. 940, 941–42 (O‘Connor, J., concurring)); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965),
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (explaining that peremptory challenges
help to ―satisfy the appearance of justice‖) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)); see also Covey, supra note 47, at 316 (explaining that one of Batson‘s functions is to
illustrate that the courts will not condone race discrimination).
168
See supra text accompanying notes 76–80 (describing the courts‘ decision to recognize
race-gender discrimination as a distinct form of discrimination protected by Title VII); see
also Castro, supra note 71, at 160 (contending that the legal system has contributed to the
subordination of women and people of color, for example, by not permitting women to
practice law); Smith, supra note 80, at 255 (concluding that economic hierarchies based on
race-gender identity exist today and are reinforced by judicial holdings); supra notes 5, 53
(examining the historical exclusion of white women and blacks from jury service); supra
note 102 (identifying a history of discrimination against white women and blacks and
illustrating the way race- and gender-based stereotypes persist in society today).
169
See supra text accompanying note 80 (explaining that the Jefferies court noted it was
important to recognize race-gender discrimination in order to deter employers from
discriminating against black women and other race-gender groups).
170
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the recognition of race-gender identity as a protected
group).
171
See supra note 76 (noting that one court has recognized that the stereotypes that Asian
women face are different than those white women or Asian men face); supra notes 100, 102
(offering examples throughout history of the distinct form of discrimination against black
women).
172
See infra notes 180, 184–86 and accompanying text (acknowledging race-gender
identity is an immutable characteristic, and many race-gender-based groups share a history
of past discrimination and lack of political power).
167
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gender identity continues to influence social relations and life
experiences today.173 Stereotypes that stem from discrimination based
on race-gender identity should not suffice to deny jurors the privilege to
serve on a jury, nor should this history of discrimination be ignored and
placed under an umbrella of race or gender discrimination. 174
Overall, the argument that recognizing race-gender identity will lead
to a limitless number of protected groups is an insufficient justification
for refusing to expand Batson.175 The consequences of not recognizing
race-gender groups, including the creation of a loophole immunizing
race- or gender-based challenges from review and the destruction of
Batson as a symbol of intolerance for discrimination, lead to the
conclusion that race-gender groups must be protected from
discrimination during jury selection.176 As explained, mere recognition
that Batson and J.E.B. already encompass race-gender groups fails to
recognize the unique discrimination faced by individuals based on their
race-gender group membership.177
D. Equal Protection Demands Recognition of Race-Gender Groups
As opposed to recognizing race-gender groups under Batson and
J.E.B., some courts have expanded Batson and recognize race-gender
Various courts and
identity as a discrete cognizable group.178

See Smith, supra note 80, at 222 (describing the various forms or combinations of
discrimination that black women may face, which differ from the type of discrimination
faced by black men or white women). Smith explains the following:
In essence, as a member of a subgroup based on race/gender, a Black
woman is not spared from experiencing multiple forms of
discrimination. She may experience subgroup discrimination as a
Black woman. She may experience group-based discrimination as a
woman. She may also experience group-based discrimination as a
Black person.
For the Black woman, there are multiple and
intersecting points of discrimination.
Id.; see also supra note 100 (offering two women‘s descriptions of the way their race-gender
identity affects their lives).
174
See supra note 23 (providing examples of blatant use of race-gender-based stereotypes
during jury selection and noting that discrimination is oftentimes much more subtle).
175
See supra Part III.A (concluding that the reasons suggested for not deeming racegender groups cognizable fail to be persuasive when analyzed more thoroughly).
176
See supra Part III.B–C (describing the negative consequences of failing to prohibit
peremptory challenges based on race-gender identity).
177
See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text (noting that merely deeming racegender groups cognizable in order to address sexism and racism is insufficient to achieve
the purpose of Batson).
178
See supra Part II.C.1 (analyzing the approach some courts have taken in adopting an
expansion of Batson).
173
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commentators advocate this expansion, an approach justified by two
main considerations.179
First, the expansion of Batson is advocated in light of the fact that the
intersection of race and gender creates a unique life viewpoint that
should not be struck from the jury.180 The desire to have a jury reflect the
diverse views of the community, although laudable, is not required by
the Constitution.181 Certain states, like Massachusetts, employ this
reasoning to extend protection to race-gender groups because their state
constitution demands that a jury be representative of the community. 182
This reasoning could not be applied, however, to states that do not have
similar constitutional provisions.183
See People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 181 (Cal. 1985) (holding that black women as a
group should be considered cognizable); People v. Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d 244, 250 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2009) (Catterson, J., dissenting) (advocating that peremptory challenges be
prohibited if they are made on the basis of the combination of race and gender); Montoya,
supra note 89, at 403 (advocating the expansion of Batson to combined race-gender groups
by applying an intersectionality approach to peremptory challenges); supra note 95 and
accompanying text (identifying courts that have expanded Batson to deem race-gender
groups cognizable).
180
See People v. Young, 105 P.3d 487, 541 (Cal. 2005) (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining
that California has chosen an expansive definition of cognizable group in order to ―ensur[e]
that no ‗perspective‘ that exists in the community at large be systematically excluded from
the jury‖); Motton, 704 P.2d at 181–82 (―The trial court‘s comparison of black women as a
cognizable group to ‗men who wear toupees‘ failed to acknowledge the ‗concurrence of
racial and sexual identity,‘ . . . which informs the attitudes of this group.‖); see also
Montoya, supra note 89, at 396–98 (offering examples of the way race-gender identity
influences one‘s life experiences). Montoya explains that even if African American women
and other race-gender groups have not been excluded from American political life by
historically explicit discriminatory laws, members of certain race-gender groups have been
uniquely affected by race- and gender-based laws. Id. at 398. She justifies expansion of
Batson to race-gender groups by explaining that ―jury deliberations stand to gain from the
inclusion of black women.‖ Id. at 400. Accepting this argument, this Note nevertheless
asserts that a finding of this type of shared group experience would be sufficient to deem
race-gender groups cognizable, but only if petit juries are required to reflect a fair crosssection of the community. See supra text accompanying notes 105–08 (explaining that
certain states may require expansion of Batson protection to combined race-gender groups
in order to properly include a fair cross-section of the community).
181
See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1990) (holding that the fair cross-section
requirement does not extend to the petit jury); see also supra note 15 (discussing the fair
cross-section requirement).
182
See supra notes 105–08 (explaining that the Massachusetts Constitution applies a fair
cross-section requirement to its petit jury, thus prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race and gender during jury selection).
183
See supra note 15 (explaining that the fair cross-section requirement does not extend to
the petit jury). Overall, because the Constitution does not require that the petit jury
represent a fair cross-section of the community, states that do not require this in their state
constitution are not compelled to prohibit race-gender-based challenges for the sole
purpose of creating a more representative jury. Cf. Holland, 493 U.S. at 486–87 (holding that
the jury does not need to represent a fair cross-section of the community); Young, 105 P.3d
179
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Second, the expansion of Batson is advocated in light of the historical
discrimination against individuals on the basis of race-gender identity.184
Notably, this analysis is frequently utilized when the racial group is a
racial minority and the gender is female.185 There is also a strong
argument that race-gender groups should receive heightened scrutiny
under equal protection, even outside the peremptory challenge realm. 186
Traditional equal protection analysis demands that distinctions on the
basis of race or gender receive heightened scrutiny; therefore, it logically
follows that distinctions based on both classes also require heightened
scrutiny.187
at 541–42 (Brown, J., concurring) (recognizing that the decision to deem race-gender groups
cognizable seems more in line with the expansive definition of cognizable group
established in California cases as opposed to the definition set forth by federal courts).
184
See Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Catterson, J., dissenting) (explaining that
discriminatory laws historically targeted both women as well as racial and ethnic
minorities, and that the discriminatory laws created ―social cross-currents‖ requiring racegender to be recognized as a cognizable group); see also supra note 102 (reviewing the
history of discrimination against race-gender groups). As illustrated in J.E.B., a past history
of discrimination is one factor justifying the expansion of Batson. See supra Part II.A
(describing the J.E.B. Court‘s review of the history of gender discrimination). This past
history of discrimination also supports the argument that litigants may harbor unique,
unarticulated biases against jurors who are members of these groups. See supra note 102
(discussing the effect that a past history of discrimination has on social interactions and
stereotypes today); see also Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 459 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that
discrimination against African American or Asian women is different from that against
individuals based on age and disability because of unique discriminatory biases against
race-gender groups); supra note 76 (discussing Luce v. Dalton). Although Luce involved an
employment discrimination claim based on two statutes rather than a peremptory
challenge issue based on the Constitution, the court‘s statement is applicable to the analysis
here. Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461.
185
See, e.g., Motton, 704 P.2d at 181–82 (holding that black women as a group should be
considered protected for purposes of Batson); Guardino, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Catterson, J.,
dissenting) (advocating that black women should constitute a cognizable group); Montoya,
supra note 89, at 403 (advocating the expansion of Batson to race-gender groups with an
emphasis on African American females).
186
Compare Scales-Trent, supra note 20, at 39 (proposing strict scrutiny for discrimination
against black women), with Smith, supra note 74, at 2028 (advocating the use of
intermediate scrutiny when analyzing discrimination against African American females
who are prevented from attending an all-male African American school).
187
See supra Part II.A (discussing the application of equal protection to peremptory
challenges). The relevancy of this analysis, however, can be called into doubt when the
discrimination in jury selection is based on the race-gender identity of groups that lack a
history of discrimination. See Young, 105 P.3d at 541 (Brown, J., concurring) (explaining that
there would need to be an adequate showing of a past history of discrimination to deem a
specific race-gender group cognizable for purposes of Batson); see also supra note 102
(discussing reports of statistics identifying disparate treatment of race-gender groups,
which consequently support Batson‘s expansion in the case of African American women,
but do not similarly justify the expansion of Batson to white males). In any event,
regardless of whether white males have experienced a past history of discrimination, they
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Regardless of the level of scrutiny required by equal protection
outside the Batson context, a juror‘s race, gender, or any combination
thereof is completely unrelated to juror qualifications.188 The use of race
or gender stereotypes in jury selection serves only as an impediment to
securing a fair trial.189 Likewise, stereotypes based on a combination of
race and gender also impede litigants from securing a fair trial.190 For
courts to permit jurors to be struck solely because they belong to a
particular race-gender group reinforces stereotypes about the group‘s
competence, a consequence the Court has sought to prevent.191
Expanding Batson is consistent with decisions regarding race-gender
discrimination in employment.192
These decisions recognize that
discrimination based on race-gender identity is a unique form of
discrimination.193 Additionally, as Title VII jurisprudence progressed,
would still receive protection through the expansion of Batson in light of the Court‘s
response to a similar argument asserting that males should not receive protection from
gender discrimination because they lack the same past history of discrimination as women.
See supra note 53; see also supra note 67 (explaining that claims of reverse discrimination in
the employment setting have been on the rise and recently received considerable media
attention).
188
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 n.6 (1994) (opining that the Court did not need
to determine whether gender classifications are inherently suspect in order to determine
that gender is an impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge); see also supra note 34
(referencing the Batson Court‘s assertion that race plays no role in assessing a person‘s
ability to serve on a jury).
189
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 (―[W]e do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges as
an institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination from
the courtroom. Instead, we consider whether peremptory challenges based on gender
stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant‘s effort to secure a fair and impartial
jury.‖).
190
See id. (explaining that the Court will consider whether the attribute at issue is related
to juror qualifications, and if not, as is the case with race and gender, a peremptory
challenge on that basis is impermissible).
191
See id. at 142 n.14. The Court noted the following:
[W]here peremptory challenges are made on the basis of group
characteristics other than race or gender . . . they do not reinforce the
same stereotypes about the group‘s competence or predispositions that
have been used to prevent them from voting, participating on juries,
pursuing their chosen professions, or otherwise contributing to civic
life.
Id.
192
See supra Part II.B (describing the court‘s treatment of race-gender groups in
employment discrimination cases).
193
See supra Part II.B (discussing the evolution of the courts‘ acceptance of complex
discrimination claims); see also Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 141–50 (applying
intersectionality theory to discrimination in the employment context); Montoya, supra note
89, at 403–04 (explaining intersectionality theory and applying it to peremptory challenges).
Intersectionality theory, as pioneered by Kimberle Crenshaw, notes that individuals who
claim combined race-gender discrimination face a different type of discrimination than that
simply based on race or gender alone. See Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 149; see also Kotkin,
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some courts felt compelled to expand the sex-plus theory to sex-plusrace.194
It seemed ―beyond belief‖ that courts could permit
discrimination against black females (two protected categories), but
prohibit discrimination based on a subgroup of one sex (a protected
category plus an unprotected category).195 Similarly, commentators have
advocated various groups be deemed cognizable for Batson purposes,
most notably religious groups, even though the group does not
traditionally receive heightened scrutiny.196 Likewise, it is beyond belief
that courts would consider extending protection to a group of
individuals who share mutable characteristics that lack a history of
discrimination without first holding that race-gender groups are
cognizable.197
The decision to deem race-gender groups cognizable, although
supported by legal precedent and logical analysis, is not sufficient on its
own to prevent discrimination against race-gender groups.198 Even if
race-gender groups are cognizable, litigants objecting to a peremptory
challenge based on race-gender discrimination will face evidentiary
issues different from those posed by challenges based solely on race or
gender.199 For example, as Professor Kotkin first acknowledged in the
employment law context, when a plaintiff alleging complex
discrimination attempts to rebut an employer‘s neutral justification for
an adverse employment action, the small number of individuals in the
plaintiff‘s class may make it difficult to show that other members of the

supra note 71, at 1486 (describing the application of intersectional scholarship to complex
bias cases but asserting that this scholarship has not sufficiently addressed issues of proof
that litigants face when bringing complex discrimination claims).
194
See supra Part II.B (explaining that the courts expanded sex-plus to include combined
race-gender discrimination, a form of sex-plus-race).
195
See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text (describing the courts‘ reasoning for
expanding sex-plus to include sex-plus-race).
196
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (identifying various courts and
commentators expanding or advocating expansion of Batson protection to a variety of
groups).
197
Compare supra note 57 (listing various cases in which litigants encouraged the
extension of Batson to other arguably cognizable groups), with supra note 79 (explaining
that the Jefferies court found it unreasonable to proscribe discrimination based on factors
other than race or gender until both race and gender, including the combination thereof,
was also a prohibited basis for employment actions).
198
See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text (explaining that it may be more
difficult for a litigant to allege race-gender discrimination than it is for a litigant to allege
race-based or gender-based discrimination).
199
See infra note 200 and accompanying text (identifying issues raised by Professor
Kotkin).
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class also experienced discriminatory treatment. 200 Similarly, it may be
difficult for a litigant to establish that other members of the same racegender group were struck from the jury because there may not be many
other potential jurors with the same race-gender background.
Overall, race-gender groups must be cognizable so as to prevent
discrimination on the basis of race or sex. 201 Also, race-gender groups
must be cognizable in light of the past history of discrimination against
these groups.202 In light of the evidentiary issues discussed, the
recognition of race-gender groups, under the current analysis or as an
expansion of Batson, is insufficient to prohibit discrimination based on
race and/or gender identity.203 The next section of this Note advocates
the recognition of race-gender groups and proposes a model state statute
that eases the burden for litigants who object to an allegedly race-genderbased peremptory challenge.204
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Courts are struggling with determining the future for peremptory
challenges.205 Despite the fact that both race and gender are improper
bases for a peremptory strike, some courts have permitted a loophole
around this command by permitting challenges based on race-gender
In addition to preventing review of unconstitutional
identity.206
peremptory challenges, the decision to permit race-gender-based
challenges negates Batson‘s message of intolerance for discrimination. 207
In order to remedy this problem, the Supreme Court should hold that
See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary burdens that
make it difficult for plaintiffs alleging complex discrimination claims to rebut an
employer‘s neutral justification for their actions).
201
See supra Part III.B (asserting that even if race-gender groups are not given protection
on their own, recognition of the group is necessary in order to prevent discrimination on
the basis of race or sex alone).
202
See supra note 184 (explaining that in light of the past history of discrimination against
race-gender groups, Batson must be expanded to prohibit further discrimination against
members of these groups).
203
See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (predicting evidentiary problems that
courts will likely face); see also infra Part IV (proposing a model state statute clarifying
Batson‘s command and protecting race-gender identity).
204
See infra Part IV (proposing a model state statute eliminating the requirement of a
prima facie showing of discrimination at the first step of the Batson procedure and
recognizing race-gender groups as cognizable).
205
See supra Part II (identifying the state of the law regarding peremptory challenges and
combined race-gender identity).
206
See supra Part III.B (discussing one of the consequences of not recognizing race-gender
groups).
207
See supra Part III.C (examining the effect that race-gender-based peremptory
challenges have on Batson‘s symbolic significance).
200
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race-gender groups are cognizable at the first step of Batson. The
Supreme Court, however, recently avoided this issue in Rivera v.
Illinois.208 Furthermore, if the experiences of plaintiffs alleging complex
claims of discrimination foreshadow the experiences of litigants
objecting to race-gender-based challenges, the mere recognition that
race-gender groups are cognizable, without more, likely will not suffice
to eradicate race-gender-based strikes.209 Another often suggested
solution to the problems created by peremptory challenges is to simply
abolish the challenge.210 As noted, it is unlikely the challenge will soon
be abolished.211
This Note proposes a model state statute that would resolve this
issue. First, this Note advocates the expansion of Batson to race-gender
groups for the reasons articulated in Part III. 212 Second, the proposed
model state statute eliminates the requirement that a litigant establish a
prima facie showing of discrimination at the first step of the Batson
procedure, easing the burden for litigants who contend that a
peremptory strike is based on race-gender identity. States should adopt
the following model statute adapted from the Louisiana Criminal
Code:213
Model State Statute
A. No peremptory challenge made by the state or the
defendant shall be based solely upon the race, or
gender, or any combination thereof of the juror. If an
objection is made that the state or defense has
excluded a juror solely on the basis of race or
gender, on any of these prohibited bases or a combination
thereof, and a prima facie case supporting that
objection is made by the objecting party, the court
See supra Part II.C.3 (analyzing Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009)).
See supra notes 82–86, 198–200 (identifying the evidentiary issues inherent in complex
discrimination claims).
210
See supra note 24 (mentioning alternative procedures that have been proposed by
other commentators).
211
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that despite the fact states are
permitted to abolish peremptory challenges, most states have chosen to allow them,
finding them to be an important tool for litigators).
212
See supra Part III.D (identifying the justifications for expanding protection to combined
race-gender groups under Batson).
213
See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795 (2010) (identifying the original text of the
Louisiana statute, which was the basis for this model statute). The normal font is the
language of the original statute. The text that appears in italics is the proposed language
the author wishes to add, and the language with a line through it is the language the
author wishes to strike from the original statute.
208
209
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may demand a satisfactory race and/or gender
neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge,
unless the court is satisfied that such reason is
apparent from the voir dire examination of the juror.
Such demand and disclosure, if required by the
court, shall be made outside of the hearing of any
juror or prospective juror.
B. The court shall allow to stand each peremptory
challenge exercised for a race and/or gender neutral
reason either apparent from the examination or
disclosed by counsel when required by the court.
The provisions of Paragraph C and this Paragraph
shall not apply when both the state and the defense
have exercised a challenge against the same juror.
C. The court shall allow to stand each peremptory
challenge for which a satisfactory racially race
neutral and/or gender neutral reason is given. Those
jurors who have been peremptorily challenged and
for whom no satisfactory racially race neutral and/or
gender neutral reason is apparent or given may be
ordered returned to the panel, or the court may take
such other corrective action as it deems appropriate
under the circumstances. The court shall make
specific findings regarding each such challenge.
Commentary
This model state statute makes the necessary changes to ensure that
race-gender identity is prohibited from being used as a basis for
peremptory challenges. This will help to close any loophole that may
permit litigants to strike jurors based on race or gender.214 It will also
demonstrate that the judiciary does not tolerate discrimination in jury
selection and combined race-gender discrimination is just as harmful as
race-based or gender-based discrimination.215
The language suggesting that a peremptory challenge may be based
partially on race or gender has been deleted by omitting the word
―solely‖ in Section A of the proposed statute. This has been done to
See supra Part III.B (explaining one of the benefits of recognizing combined racegender identity).
215
See supra Part III.C (identifying the symbolic significance of protecting combined racegender identity from discrimination in jury selection).
214
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ensure that if a litigant offers a valid, non-discriminatory justification for
a peremptory challenge coupled with a race, gender, or race-gender
justification, the peremptory challenge must be denied by the court.216
Even a sole impermissible justification suffices to render the peremptory
challenge improper, as set forth in this model statute.
Recognizing race-gender groups cognizable in this fashion also
serves to encourage courts to be conscious of the reality that race-gender
discrimination occurs and must be remedied. As Professor Kotkin
explained in her discussion regarding complex claims of employment
discrimination, as courts become more cognizant of complex forms of
discrimination, valid challenges to race-gender-based actions will be
more likely to prevail.217
Finally, language requiring a prima facie case of discrimination has
been deleted. This eliminates the prima facie requirement at the first
step of the Batson procedure. Once a party believes opposing counsel is
making inappropriate peremptory challenges, the party can object, note
the type of discrimination alleged, such as race, gender, or race-gender,
and the opposing party must come forth with a neutral justification.
This would lower the evidentiary burden a litigant must meet in order to
object to a peremptory challenge, which is especially important when
dealing with combined race-gender discrimination.218
Some states may fear that elimination of the prima facie requirement
in Batson will destroy the peremptory challenge. This is not the case. As
discussed, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, and the
Military Court of Appeals have eliminated the prima facie step and have
not needed to eliminate the challenge altogether.219 Also, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibit litigants from using peremptory
In sum, the
challenges solely for gamesmanship purposes. 220

See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (examining the issue of mixed motives
and their place in peremptory challenge jurisprudence); supra note 161 (illustrating one
way in which the failure to deem race-gender groups cognizable would prevent review of
peremptory challenges that would normally be denied by the court if the court applies a
dual motivation analysis).
217
See supra text accompanying note 86 (proposing that as courts become more conscious
of the danger of stereotypes about various groups, allegations of complex forms of
discrimination will be more likely to prevail).
218
See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (articulating the unique evidentiary
concerns faced by litigants objecting to peremptory challenges based on combined racegender discrimination).
219
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that Florida does not require a
prima facie showing of discrimination as set forth by the Batson Court).
220
See supra note 42 (discussing the safeguards already imposed on litigants that prevent
a proliferation of needless Batson hearings from taking place if the first step of the Batson
test is eliminated).
216
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combination of recognizing race-gender identity as an impermissible
basis for peremptory challenges and eliminating the prima facie
requirement at the first step of Batson will ensure that jurors are not
excluded from the jury because of their race, gender, or race-gender
identity.
V. CONCLUSION
Peremptory challenges are intended to assist litigants in selecting a
fair and impartial jury.221 Despite the danger that they will be exercised
in a discriminatory manner, courts and legislatures continue to permit
their use.222 The peremptory challenge, however, is not exempt from the
Equal Protection Clause.223 Past Supreme Court cases demonstrate that
the judiciary is prepared to impose limitations on the peremptory
challenge in order to protect a potential juror‘s right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of their race or gender. 224
In the true spirit of Batson, states should ensure that potential jurors
are not brought in for voir dire simply to be excused due to their racegender identity.225 The jurors discussed in the introductory hypothetical
will never know why they were asked to leave the courtroom that day.
Did the prosecutor notice a juror‘s facial expression showing empathy
for the defendant? Or was the prosecutor acting on illegitimate
stereotypes about black men? Until race-gender identity is recognized as
a discrete, protected class for purposes of peremptory challenges, future
potential jurors who face this situation will be sent home feeling rejected
by a system that is supposed to ensure justice for all. 226
The courts have made great progress in working to eliminate
discrimination in our society, as illustrated through Batson and its
progeny prohibiting race- and gender-based strikes. It is time for state
legislatures to take the next step; prohibit race-gender-based peremptory
challenges. Author Dorothy Allison‘s quote, which begins this Note, is
especially pertinent in this setting.227 ―Class, race, sexuality, gender—
See supra note 18 (identifying the purpose of peremptory challenges).
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
223
See supra Part II.A (describing the application of equal protection to the peremptory
challenge).
224
See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Supreme Court has demonstrated that it will
impose restrictions on peremptory challenges when necessary to abide by the requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause).
225
See supra Part III.D (advocating expansion of Batson to groups based on race-gender
identity).
226
See supra note 167 (repeating Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion that Batson is a reflection of
―what this Nation stands for‖).
227
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
221
222
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and all other categories by which we categorize and dismiss each other—
need to be excavated from the inside.‖ 228 In order to avoid the
perpetuation of race, gender, and race-gender stereotypes, race-genderbased peremptory challenges must be eliminated.
Leah M. Provost*

ALLISON, supra note 1, at 35.
J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2011); B.S., Human
Development and Family Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2008). I would like to
thank Valparaiso University School of Law Professors Laura Dooley and Rosalie Levinson
for their comments on earlier versions of this Note. Special thanks to my family and
friends for their love and support. In particular, I‘d like to thank my mother, Julie, for
always having an unbelievable amount of confidence in me; my sister, Lindsay, for her
regular comic relief; and my friend, Keith McNeely, for his encouragement, patience, and
late-night trips to Starbucks.
228
*

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

